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Self-interested agents (e.g., interest groups, researchers) produce veriable evidence in an
attempt to convince a principal (e.g., legislator, funding organization) to act on their behalf
(e.g., introduce legislation, fund research). Agents provide less informative evidence than the
principal prefers since doing so maximizes the probability the principal acts in their favor. If the
principal faces budget or other constraints that limit the number of agents whose proposals she
can support, then agents produce more-accurate evidence as they compete for priority. Under
reasonable conditions, the principal is better o when her capacity to act is limited.
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11 Introduction
Imagine that a legislator must decide which earmark projects to bring before the appropriations
subcommittee. Each project is supported by an interest group, who benets only if its project
is funded. In order to convince the legislator that its project deserves funding, an interest group
may collect evidence about the project's impact on the local economy, or popularity among the
legislator's constituents. Although it may be dicult for the interest group to falsify evidence
outright, the evidence that it chooses to produce may not completely reveal all relevant information
about the costs and benets of the project. For example, an interest group decides how many
constituents to poll about their support for a project. If it surveys few constituents, then the survey
outcome (whatever it is) is not very informative about the project's popularity. If the interest group
polls a large portion of constituents, then the resulting evidence is signicantly more informative.
In some cases, the legislator may be able to fund any project she believes has an expected benet.
However, empirical evidence exists to the contrary. According to (Frisch and Kelly 2010, 2011), the
appropriations committee systematically limits the total amount of earmark funding that legislators
can request for their home districts. A similar story could describe a legislator selecting which pieces
of legislation to pursue; time and procedural constraints may prevent her from actively pursuing
all reforms that she believes to be better than the status quo.
Alternatively, consider an organization oering grant money to researchers. Many grant appli-
cations require some description of preliminary ndings, which may be dicult to falsify. However,
these ndings may vary in how informative they are about the project's overall promise. Highly
speculative preliminary ndings may not be extremely informative about the research project's
ultimate chances of success. In many cases, one may conduct preliminary research that produces
more-convincing evidence about a proposal's ultimate chance of success. Depending on the or-
ganization's budget, it may have the capability to approve all grant proposals if it believes it is
appropriate to do so, or it may face binding budget constraints that potentially prevent it from
funding all projects even if it believes all of them to be worthwhile.
Motivated by these examples and others, we develop a game theoretic model in which two
independent, self-interested agents produce veriable evidence in am eort to convince a principal
to accept proposals of unknown quality. Each agent supports a dierent proposal. An agent benets
if the principal accepts his proposal, regardless of its quality. The principal, however, prefers to
accept good proposals and reject bad proposals. We focus on situations in which neither principal
nor agents know the qualities of the proposals (at the beginning of the interaction). For instance,
both the interest groups and the legislator may be uncertain about constituent support for an
earmark project or policy reform prior to polling. Before she makes decides which proposal(s) to
accept, the principal observes evidence produced by the agents, which conveys information about
proposal quality. This evidence is veriable: agents cannot manipulate or misrepresent the evidence
that they uncover (nor would they choose to keep it hidden). However, before uncovering evidence,
agents determine how informative their evidence will be (e.g. the interest group chooses how many
constituents to poll). After observing the evidence, the principal decides which, if any, proposals
2to accept. If the principal can accept all proposals, then her capacity is unlimited. However, as is
more typical, the principal may be constrained in her ability to accept proposals. If she is unable
to accept all proposals, then she has limited capacity.1
We begin by identifying a strong conict of interest between the principal and agents that exists
whenever capacity is unlimited.2 The principal benets from accepting good proposals and rejecting
bad proposals. She therefore prefers that agents produce fully-informative evidence, ensuring that
she always makes the right decision. Agents, on the other hand, want to maximize the probability
that the principal accepts their proposals. Because of this, the agents produce less-than-fully-
informative evidence. To understand why an agent keeps the principal less-informed, imagine rst
that the principal is initially optimistic about the proposal. If she would be willing to accept based
on the prior alone, there is no reason for the agent to produce informative evidence. On the other
hand, if the principal would reject the proposal based on the prior, then the agent must produce
informative evidence in his favor for his proposal to be accepted. However, he will choose to supply
evidence that is just informative enough for a good outcome to sway the principal in favor of the
proposal. He will never make the principal fully informed. In fact, when capacity is unlimited, the
evidence supplied by the agents is eectively worthless. The principal's payo is the same as if she
never observes the signal and only acts according to her prior.3
The primary goal of our analysis is to show that limited capacity can mitigate or eliminate this
conict of interest between principal and agents. First, we show that limited capacity increases the
quality of evidence produced by the agents. Second, we show that these informational benets can
dominate the costs that come with limited capacity. The principal often expects be better o with
limited capacity.
Under limited capacity, it is not enough for agents to convince the principal that their proposal
is likely benecial. They also must convince the principal their proposal is a better choice than
the other proposal. In this sense, limited capacity creates a competition in which agents produce
more-informative evidence as they vie for priority. In equilibrium, the principal is exposed to
more informative evidence under limited capacity than under unlimited capacity. However, a more
informed principal is not necessarily better o. Limited capacity imposes a capacity constraint
that has the potential to make the principal worse o; she cannot accept both proposals even when
she expects to benet from doing so. Our second set of results demonstrate that the informational
benets of limited capacity can dominate the downside of being constrained. Indeed, as long as she
is not extremely optimistic about both proposals, the principal strictly prefers limited capacity.4
The analysis proceeds in two parts. In Section 3, we begin with a relatively simple version
1These types of capacity constraints could arise for a number of dierent reasons; for example, the principal may
have a limited budget (e.g. to fund projects or make purchases), or limited time (e.g. to introduce legislation).
2The discussion of the results in this paragraph focuses on the more-general model of Section 4. While the results
also hold in the simpler binary model, some of the results in the simple case are less clear-cut.
3This is true even though there are no direct costs to producing informative evidence. Agents do not supply
informative evidence in order to strategically manipulate the principal's beliefs, not to save on costs. Including an
explicit cost of supplying evidence does not change the qualitative nature of the results.
4Again, this result is true in the model with general signal structures. In the simple game we initially present, the
result is less clear cut.
3of the game in which we make two simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that proposals
are ex ante identical. Second, we model evidence in a simple fashion. We assume that evidence
is the realization of a binary signal that correctly reects the true quality of the proposal with
some probability , chosen by the agent. The simple signal structure leads to a straightforward
interpretation:  represents the accuracy (informativeness) of the evidence presented by an agent.
We rely on this version of the game to develop intuition for the results.
In Section 4, we relax both simplifying assumptions, developing a more-general version of the
game. In this section we allow for heterogeneous proposals; the prior beliefs associated with each
proposal need not be identical. We also do not constrain an agent's evidence production to be
represented by a binary signal structure, nor do we require that signals belong to a particular
parametric class. We allow agents to design the experiment (i.e. the signal) that they use to
produce evidence in a general way. Despite the complexity of the game in this environment, we
are able to fully solve the model and provide a complete characterization of the equilibrium under
all parameter values. The primary results are similar under both the binary game and the general
game: the principal is better informed and (sometimes) better o when her capacity is limited.
In addition to showing that the main results hold in a general environment, the section provides
a series of novel results concerning agent asymmetries that were not present in the more-simple
game.
Section 5 discusses a number of applications, including the legislator and grant writing examples
discussed above, as well as additional examples involving a consumer making purchase decisions,
a college deciding which applicants receive admissions or scholarships, a rm executive deciding
which products to bring to market or which divisions to expand, and the FDA choosing which drugs
to approve. In each of these situations, limited capacity may be a reality of the decision making
process. Whereas the costs of limited capacity are largely understood, we demonstrate that these
limitations may also have informational benets. These benets can be so large that the principal
prefers to have capacity limitations.
2 Related Literature
The insightful work of Austen-Smith and Wright (1992) (henceforth AW) presents a model of
adversarial evidence production. As in our model, both the politician (principal) and lobbyists
(agents) are uncertain about the qualities of competing alternatives, and the politician must rely
on lobbyists to supply evidence. A number of key dierences between AW and our model exist,
however. First, our evidentiary structure is more complex. In AW, agents make a binary decision
about whether or not to produce evidence; the accuracy of their evidence is not a choice variable.
In our framework, agents choose not only whether to produce evidence,5 they also choose the
informativeness of the evidence that they do produce. The main focus of our analysis is on the
informativeness of evidence chosen by the agents, a consideration that is not possible in AW.
5The decision not to produce evidence is equivalent to sending an uninformative signal.
4Second, the agents in AW represent mutually exclusive policy alternatives (e.g., one interest group
advocating in support of and the other against a smoking ban). In our framework, choosing
an action that benets one agent does not necessarily prevent the principal from simultaneously
choosing an action that benets the other agent; proposals are not, by nature, mutually exclusive
alternatives. This does not mean that the principal is necessarily able to act in favor of both agents,
just that her inability to do so is caused by factors such as limited budgets or time constraints and
is not an inherent feature of the proposals under consideration. This allows our framework to
describe a variety of situations which do not necessarily t into the AW framework (e.g., college
admissions, grant funding, earmarks). It also makes for a natural comparison between outcomes
when the principal is able to act in favor of all agents (e.g., has a suciently large budget to fund
all grant proposals if she sees t) and outcomes when the principal is constrained (e.g., due to
budget limitations) in her ability to support agents.6
In recent articles, Brocas et al. (in press) and Gul and Pesendorfer (in press) analyze dynamic
models of adversarial evidence production, where|as in our analysis{the correct course of action
is unknown to all parties, and agents supply evidence that is publicly observed. Like AW, however
agents have opposing preferences over a single policy and agents do not control the quality of
evidence directly.7 Furthermore, in these models the decisions to acquire information are made
in a sequentially rational manner. These works are therefore best suited to describing prolonged
advertising or persuasion campaigns, rather than to the types of decisions we study.
Other articles relate to our underlying evidence production framework but do not consider ei-
ther direct or indirect competition between agents. Brocas and Carrillo (2007) study a dynamic
information acquisition game, in which a leader has the capability to generate information that
inuences the decision of a follower with dierent preferences.8 Kamenica and Gentzkow (in press)
consider the problem of a sender who tries to inuence the action of a receiver by designing a signal
whose realization will be observed by the receiver prior to choosing an action. Like Brocas and Car-
rillo, these authors characterize environments in which the sender benets from persuasion. These
results are closely related to our results for a decision making environment with unlimited capacity.
6Additional dierences between AW and our paper include AW's assumptions that signal collection is costly, and
that agents privately observe their signals before deciding whether to share them with the principal (although the
search choice is observed). Instead, for reasons discussed in the analysis, we assume that signal collection is without
cost and any signal is publicly observable (although these assumptions are not required for our main results to hold
qualitatively). Although the AW assumptions provide a more realistic description of some settings, we believe they
would likely distract from our results. Adding costs of signal accuracy, for example, will make agents even less likely
to collect informative signals, and would distract from the more interesting nding that agents prefer to keep the
principal less-than-fully informed, even when signals are costless to produce.
7Both articles are concerned with the eect of cost dierences on equilibrium outcomes. In both analyses, a public
draw from a given informative signal is revealed, as long as one party chooses to exert eort. Thus, taking a new
draw can be regarded as a decision to reveal new information to the decision maker, aecting her beliefs about which
policy is best. However, in these analyses no action directly aects the informativeness of the signal itself. (Note
that if players could committ to acquire a certain number of signal realizations initially, the adversaries would be
competing in a manner similar to our model.)
8Brocas and Carrillo's analysis is best suited to applications with a temporal component, for example, the problem
of a committee chairman deciding when to suspend debate and call a vote on a proposal. The authors describe
situations in which the leader benets from controlling the ow of public information.
5However, even there, our focus is quite dierent: we are primarily concerned with determining the
extent to which limited capacity improves the incentives for agents to supply accurate signals. This
comparison is impossible in their analysis, as they focus on the case of a single agent. Building
on their earlier results, Gentzkow and Kamenica (2011) analyze a persuasion environment with
multiple players. They show that (i) moving from collusive to competitive play, (ii) introducing
additional senders, (iii) decreasing alignment of sender preferences increase the amount of informa-
tion revealed in equilibrium. We look at an alternative to these remedies. In our environment a
restricted action space for the decision maker improves information accuracy.
We focus on the agents' choice of evidence quality, and assume that evidence is perfectly ob-
servable by the principal. We could relax this assumption slightly, assuming that evidence becomes
private information of the agent, who then decides whether to transmit this evidence to the prin-
cipal. If the principal can observe that evidence has been generated, and communication and
verication is costless, then the disclosure game unravels, so that evidence is eectively observed
by the principal.9 Henry (2009) considers the impact that mandatory research disclosure rules may
have on an agent's decision to acquire evidence. Che and Kartik (2009) consider how dierences
of opinion between decision makers and agents aects the agents' incentives to acquire and trans-
mit evidence.10 Other articles assume that agents know their evidence ahead of time, and must
choose whether to disclose it (e.g., Milgrom 1981, Milgrom and Roberts 1986, Bull and Watson
2004). Cotton (2009) presents a model in which agents must compete for access to disclose their
evidence to a time-constrained decision maker. The preferences of agents in our paper are similar
to advocates in Dewatripont and Tirole (1999).
3 A Model with Symmetric Proposals and Binary Evidence
A principal (she) and two agents (he) play a two-stage game. All parties are risk-neutral. The
principal must decide whether to accept or reject each of two separate proposals. She prefers to
accept a proposal only if the proposal is of suciently high quality. The agents are associated with
separate proposals. Each agent wants the principal to accept his proposal regardless of quality.
Initially, both the principal and agents are uncertain about the quality of each proposal. Before the
principal chooses which proposals to accept, each agent can produce evidence about the quality of
his proposal.11
To keep the analysis as straightforward as possible, we assume that each proposal is either
\good" (i.e., i = g) or \bad" (i.e., i = b). If accepted, all good proposals provide the same net
benet and all bad proposals provide the same net loss to the principal. The true quality of each
proposal is unknown to all players, but it is common knowledge that quality is an i.i.d. draw from
9See the analysis of Kamenica and Gentzkow (in press) for more information on this point.
10Austen-Smith (1998) considers similar questions in a model of political access.
11Although we present the model as one in which the principal decides whether to accept dierent proposals,
nothing is changed if we adapt the terminology to refer to the principal awarding funding, admitting applicant,
implementing policy, or making other decisions that directly aect agent payos.
6a Bernoulli distribution:
Pr(i = g) = 
Pr(i = b) = 1   .
If the principal rejects proposal i, she earns proposal-specic payo wi = 0 independent of i.
If the principal implements proposal i, she earns proposal payo wi = 1  > 0 when the proposal
is good and wi =   < 0 when the proposal is bad. Preference parameter  2 (0;1) represents
the \stakes" inherent in the principal's decision: when  is large, the downside of accepting bad
proposals is high compared to the upside of accepting good proposals.12 The principal's total payo
is the sum of her payos from each proposal: w = w1 + w2. Agents benet only if their proposal
is accepted, with i receiving ui = 1 if proposal i is accepted and ui = 0 if rejected.
In the rst stage of the game, each agent simultaneously commissions independent research to
produce veriable information about the quality of its proposal. The research outcome is a publicly
observable realization Si 2 fG;Bg, of signal si with the following conditional distribution:13
Pr(si = G j i = g) = Pr(si = B j i = b) = i
Pr(si = G j i = b) = Pr(si = B j i = g) = 1   i.
The signal realization (or outcome) reects true quality of the proposal with probability i 2 [1
2;1].
We therefore refer to i as the \accuracy" of si. Increasing accuracy improve the informativeness
of the signal in the sense of Blackwell. A signal with the lowest accuracy, i = 1
2, is completely
uninformative; a signal with the highest accuracy, i = 1, is fully informative about quality.
Agent i controls the accuracy of signal si.14 When an agent commissions research, he chooses
the ability of the researcher. Higher ability researchers are more likely to produce accurate ndings.
Alternatively, the agent may inuence the informativeness of the signal by choosing the research
design directly. Once both agents choose their signal accuracy, these choices are observed by the
principal. By implication, the principal is able to observe and correctly interpret the identity,
credentials, and reputation of the researcher; alternatively, she is able to observe and eectively
analyze the informativeness of the research design.15 In a later section, we consider a signicantly
more general framework in which agents design general signals and demonstrate that our results
12This specication is without loss of generality. If the principal's payo from accepting a good proposal is v > 0
while the payo of accepting a bad proposal is  c < 0, dividing both payos by v + c gives the specication dened
in the text.
13Identical results would hold if the research outcome (signal) were private information for the agent, provided
this research outcome was veriable, i.e. could be witheld but not falsely reported. See Kamenica and Gentzkow (in
press) for more information. Identical results would also hold if the signal realization were privately observed by the
principal, i.e. if it is a subjective impression, rather than veriable evidence.
14In our framework there is no exogenous cost for increasing signal accuracy. Therefore, if agents do not provide
fully informative signals, it is because they prefer such signals for strategic reasons, not because more informative
signals require too much eort or money to generate. Including an exogenous cost does not alter the qualitative
nature of the results.
15In some elds, research protocols must be registered in a database before subjects are enrolled. Sti penalties
exist for violating the protocols.
7continue to hold.
At the beginning of the second stage, the principal observes both signal realizations. On the
basis of all available information (prior information, signal accuracies and signal realizations), the
principal chooses which proposals, if any, to accept. Once the principal makes her decision, the true
quality of any accepted proposal is then revealed, and all payos are realized. This is a game of
imperfect but symmetric information, similar to the persuasion games analyzed in Kamenica and
Gentzkow (in press) and Brocas et al. (in press).
The principal's ability to accept proposals may be either limited or unlimited. If capacity is
unlimited, she can accept neither, either, or both proposals as she sees t. In this case no link exists
between proposals; the decision to accept each proposal is made independently. Alternatively, when
capacity is limited, she can accept at most one proposal. This limitation may arise for a variety of
reasons: she may be constrained by limited budgets or limited time, she may also be constrained
by procedural or bureaucratic hurdles that require considerable eort to overcome. When capacity
is limited, a decision to accept a proposal precludes the possibility of accepting the other proposal.
Therefore, acceptance decisions cannot be made in isolation; the signals and accuracies for both
proposals inuence the principal's decision. The capacity of the decision making environment is
common knowledge.
We solve for Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of this two stage game under the limited and unlimited
capacity systems. In the rst stage, agents simultaneously choose their respective signal accuracies,
1 and 2. Once both agents choose their accuracies, these become public. In the second stage, the
signals are realized, and the principal decides which proposals to accept, subject to the constraints
of the decision making environment.
3.1 Unlimited Capacity
We begin by analyzing a setting in which the principal is unconstrained in her ability to accept
proposals. Therefore, the principal accepts any proposal for which the expected payo from doing
so is positive. This expected payo depends on her posterior belief about the quality of the proposal
after observing the realization of the signal. Let ^ (Si;i) denote the principal's belief that proposal
i is good after observing signal realization Si; given accuracy i:
^ (G;i) =
i
i + (1   )(1   i)
^  (B;i) =
 (1   i)
 (1   i) + (1   )i
The principal accepts proposal i if
^ i(Si;i)(1   )   (1   ^ i(Si;i))  0 () ^ i(Si;i)  .
8Thus the principal accepts if the updated probability of a good proposal is at least as great as the
stakes, . Otherwise, she rejects the proposal. We assume that the principal accepts a proposal if
she is indierent between accepting and rejecting.
If  < , then the principal is predisposed against accepting: if her decision were based solely on
her prior belief, she would reject each proposal. In this case, observing a bad signal realization rein-
forces the principal's beliefs that the proposal is bad, and she continues to favor rejection. Observing
a good signal realization, however, improves her belief about the quality of the project. When the
good realization is generated by a suciently accurate signal, it overturns her predisposition and
causes her to accept the proposal. This is the case when
^  (G;i)   () i 
(1   )





(1   ) + (1   )
.
Therefore, for a good signal realization to persuade the principal to accept a proposal that she is
predisposed against, it must be that
i  r.
If signal accuracy is suciently low, then a good signal outcome is not persuasive enough to overturn
the principal's predisposition to reject.
If   , then the principal is predisposed in favor of accepting; her prior is suciently optimistic
that she would accept each proposal given her prior alone. In this case, observing a good signal
realization only strengthens the principal's beliefs that the proposal is good, and she continues to
favor accepting. Observing a bad signal realization, however, weakens her beliefs that the proposal
is good. When the signal is suciently accurate, the bad realization overturns her predisposition
and causes her to reject the proposal. This is the case when
^  (B;i) <  () i > 1  
(1   )
(1   ) + (1   )
= 1   r.
If signal accuracy is suciently low, then a bad realization is not persuasive enough to overturn
her predisposition in favor of accepting.
The above discussion is summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.1 When accepting capacity is unlimited, the principal's equilibrium strategy is:
 If predisposed in favor of accepting,   , then the principal rejects proposal i if and only if
si = B and i 2 (1   r;1].
 If predisposed against accepting,  < , then the principal accepts proposal i if and only if
si = G and i 2 [r;1].
9A persuasive signal has the potential to overturn the principal's predisposition; no realization
of a weak signal aects the principal's decision. When   , a persuasive signal has accuracy
 > 1   r. When  < , a persuasive signal has accuracy   r. Otherwise, the signal is weak.
Agents anticipate the principal's behavior when they choose signal accuracy. Suppose that the
principal is predisposed in favor of accepting, i.e.,   . In this case, the principal implements
the proposal even if the signal is weak. Choosing a persuasive signal introduces the possibility that
the principal observes a bad realization and does not implement the reform. In this case, agents
strictly prefer weak signals.
Alternatively, suppose that the principal is predisposed against accepting, i.e.,  < . If an
agent chooses a weak signal, then the proposal is rejected. If the agent chooses a persuasive signal,
then the proposal is accepted if and only if si = G. Let () denote the probability of observing a
good realization given accuracy :
()   + (1   )(1   ).
When the signal is persuasive, the proposal is accepted with probability (), which is also the
agent's expected payo. An agent's optimal signal accuracy maximizes () subject to  2 [r;1].
If  < 1
2, then  is strictly decreasing in , and the agent prefers  = r to any higher value. He also
prefers  = r to any weak signal, as supplying the marginally persuasive signal leads to a positive
probability of the proposal being implemented. If  < 1
2, then this is the only possible case. If,
however,  > 1
2, then we must also consider the possibility that  is such that 1
2   < . In this
case, the principal is predisposed against accepting proposals that are most likely good (and are
more likely than not to generate good signals). In this case, () is strictly increasing in  and the
agent prefers  = 1 to any lower value.
These observations lead to the following description of the equilibrium outcome.
Lemma 3.2 In equilibrium under unlimited capacity,
 If   , then for each i the agent chooses a weak signal, the principal accepts the proposal,
and
E [wi] = (1   )   (1   ) =     and E [ui] = 1.
 If  < q and  < 1
2, then for each i, i = r, the principal accepts proposal i if and only if
si = G, and
E [wi] = 0 and E [ui] = (r) > .
 If 1
2   < , then for each i i = 1, the principal accepts proposal i if and only if si = G,
and
E [wi] = (1   ) and E [ui] = .
Although the principal nds a fully-informative signal optimal, agents choose  = 1 in only one
situation: when the principal is predisposed against accepting and proposals are most-likely good
10(i.e., when 1
2   < ). In all other cases, the agent prefers to keep the principal less than fully-
informed, and provides either a weak or marginally-persuasive signal. If the principal is predisposed
in favor of accepting, then it is a dominant strategy for the agent to choose a weak signal. Doing so
assures that the principal implements the proposal. If the principal is predisposed against accepting
and proposals are most-likely bad ( < 1
2 and  < ), then agents choose signal accuracies that are
just strong enough to make the principal indierent between accepting and rejecting their proposals
if she observes a good signal realization. This maximizes the probability that the principal observes
a favorable realization and implements the proposal.
In the unlimited capacity system, two critical factors determine the agents' incentives to supply
accurate signals. The rst critical factor is the monotonicity of  (). When the proposal is most-
likely good ( > 1
2), increasing a persuasive signal's accuracy makes a good realization more likely,
which increases the probability that the proposal will be accepted; accuracy is success-enhancing.
However, when the signal is most-likely bad ( < 1
2),  () is decreasing. In this case increasing the
accuracy of a persuasive signal decreases the probability of generating a good realization and hurts
the probability of proposal implementation; accuracy is therefore success-diminishing. Thus, the
prior belief determines which signal accuracy is optimal among the persuasive signals. The second
critical factor is the principal's predisposition toward the proposal, determined by the relationship
between  and . The principal's predisposition determines whether or not the agents prefer to
produce persuasive or weak signals. If the principal is predisposed towards accepting, agents strictly
prefer weak signals to persuasive ones; if the principal is predisposed against accepting, then agents
strictly prefer persuasive signals to weak ones. The severity of the conict of interest between the
agents and the principal thus depends critically on the interaction between these two forces.
(The problem with) Commitment
The principal prefers  = 1 to all lower values, as it allows for a fully-informed decision. The
politician's sequentially rational strategy, however, implements any proposal for which ^   , even
if  < 1. The agents recognize this and prefer to produce a less than fully informative signal.
If the principal could credibly commit to a strategy at the onset of the game, she could guarantee
her ideal outcome by committing to reject any proposal for which i < 1. That is, she would commit
to reject any proposal for which she is less-than-fully informed about its quality. The agents would
react by always choosing  = 1, guaranteeing a fully-informed policy decision. In some situations
such commitment may be reasonable. If we imagine an innitely repeated sequence of stage games
between a long-lived principal and short-lived agents, the principal's commitment power could be
derived from reputation (provided her discount factor is suciently high). However, in a static
game, the principal would have to derive commitment power from writing some kind of contract,
under which she commits to reject any proposal for which the signal is not fully revealing.
This type of contract is problematic for several reasons. First, these types of contracts may be
prohibited for institutional or legal reasons. In politics, for example, legislators typically cannot
contract with interest groups to choose favorable policy conditional upon some action by the agent.
11Second, even if contracts are allowed, deriving commitment power from writing legally binding
contracts, may prove dicult. Signal accuracy may not be veriable in court, rendering any contract
based on accuracy unenforceable. Furthermore, even if  were veriable, both the principal and
agent would prefer to disregard the contract and allow the proposal to be implemented if the agent
produced a favorable, persuasive signal realization with  < 1. In our analysis, we focus on a
principal who cannot commit to accept only those proposals with perfectly informative signals.
3.2 Limited Capacity
In the previous section where the principal could implement as many proposals as she wanted,
the principal's choice regarding one proposal was independent of her choice regarding the other
proposal. In this section, the principal can implement at most one of the two proposals. Here,
choosing to implement one proposal excludes the possibility of implementing the other proposal.
Therefore, to get his proposal accepted, it is no longer enough for an agent to provide sucient
evidence to convince the principal that his proposal has a positive expected payo. The agent must
also convince the principal that his proposal is more-likely benecial than the alternative option.
In this section, we derive the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the game under limited capacity.
The characterization of equilibrium depends on (i) whether the principal is predisposed in favor
or against proposals, and (ii) whether the proposal is most-likely good or bad. When  = 1
2, the
principal is predisposed in favor of proposals that are most-likely good and against proposals that
are most likely bad. When  < 1
2, the stakes are small enough that the principal may be predisposed
in favor of proposals for which the probability of being good is less than 1
2. Conversely, when  > 1
2,
the stakes are large enough that the principal may be predisposed against projects that are more
likely to be good than bad. Given this, we must consider four mutually exclusive parameter cases.
1. When the principal is predisposed against proposals, and proposals are most-likely good.
2. When the principal is predisposed in favor of proposals, and proposals are most-likely bad.
3. When the principal is predisposed against proposals, and proposals are most-likely bad.
4. When the principal is predisposed in favor of proposals, and proposals are most-likely good.
In cases 1 and 2, limited capacity does not encourage agents to produce more-informative signals.
In case 1, agents prefer to produce a fully-informative signal (1 = 2 = 1) even when capacity is
unlimited.16 In case 2 agents prefer to keep the principal uninformed (1 = 2 = 1
2) even under
limited capacity.17 In these two cases, limited capacity does alter agent behavior.
In cases 3 and 4, limited capacity introduces competitive pressure between the agents, who must
provide more-accurate evidence than the other agent to have priority when both agents produce
16Both critical factors line up in favor of signal accuracy: the principal is predisposed against, and, because proposals
are most-likely good, accuracy is success-enhancing.
17In this case, both critical factors line up against signal accuracy: principal is predisposed in favor, and accuracy
is success-diminishing.
12favorable signal realizations. This competitive pressure results in the agents choosing more-accurate
signals, and in a more-informed principal. The discussion below focuses on these two cases, rst
showing that limited capacity increases signal accuracy, then deriving conditions under which the
principal prefers limited capacity.
3.3 Principal predisposed against and proposals most-likely bad
The rst case we consider is one in which the principal is predisposed against accepting (i.e.,  < )
and proposals are most likely bad (i.e.,  < 1
2). We have already shown that if capacity is unlimited,
then in this case both agents will supply marginally persuasive signals, 1 = 2 = r. That is, both
agents provide just-accurate-enough signals to make the principal indierent between implementing
and not implementing their proposals in the event that their signal produces a favorable realization.
When the principal can implement at most one proposal, this is no longer an equilibrium.
In the case of limited capacity, an agent prefers to provide a marginally-more accurate signal
than the other agent. Producing a marginally more accurate signal than one's opponent results in
the agent having priority in the event that both signal realizations are favorable, while having only
a marginally lower probability of producing favorable evidence. This leaves open the possibility of
two types of equilibria. The rst possibility involves both agents producing fully informative signals;
in which case, marginally increasing accuracy is not possible. The second possibility involves the
agents playing mixed strategies over a continuum of signal accuracies with the only possible mass
point on i = 1. We provide a detailed characterization of the equilibria in the appendix, showing
that when  is low agents mix over a continuum with support between the marginally persuasive
accuracy r and some upper bound   2 (r;1], where   is strictly increasing in  up to   = 1. For
higher , the upper bound   is then decreasing in , and the mixing distribution develops a mass
point on i = 1.
We formally characterize the equilibrium in the appendix. Lemma 3.3 summarizes the equilib-
rium results.
Lemma 3.3 Under limited capacity with  <  and  < 1
2, there exists a threshold value of
^  2 [;1] such that:
 If   ^ , then the unique equilibrium involves both agents producing fully-informative signals,
1 = 2 = 1.
 If  < ^ , then the only equilibria involve both agents playing mixed strategies such that 1;2 >
r with probability 1.




^  >  and thus the type of equilibrium depends on the exact value of . If   3 
p
5
2 , then ^  = 
and all  >  exceed ^ . Therefore, when  is not too low, the only equilibrium involves both agents
producing fully-informative signals. Proposition 3.4, the main result for this case, holds as long as
 <  and  < 1
2, regardless of whether the equilibrium involves pure or mixed strategies.
13Proposition 3.4 When  <  and  < 1
2,
 With probability one, each agent provides a more accurate signal under limited capacity than
under unlimited capacity.
 The principal prefers limited capacity to unlimited capacity.
Under unlimited capacity, both agents provide marginally pivotal signals, setting 1 = 2 = r.
Under limited capacity, as determined by Lemma 3.3, the agents either provide fully-informative
signals, or they play a mixed strategy that involves both agents producing evidence that almost
certainly has accuracy greater than r. Regardless of whether the limited capacity game achieves
the pure strategy or mixed strategy equilibrium, the agents produce more informative evidence
than in the equilibrium of the unlimited capacity game.
That the principal tends to be more informed under limited capacity does not in itself imply
that the principal prefers limited capacity to unlimited capacity. This is because limited capacity
prevents the principal from implementing both proposals, even when both have positive expected
value. When the principal is predisposed against proposals, this potential cost of limited capac-
ity never negates the expected benets that come from more-accurate signals. Recall, that with
unlimited capacity, agents supply marginally persuasive signals, and the principal is, at best, indif-
ferent between implementing and rejecting proposals. Her equilibrium expected payo under the
unlimited capacity system is always zero. Under limited capacity, the probability that she accepts
a proposal which generates a positive expected surplus is non-zero in each type of equilibrium.
Thus her expected payo is positive under limited capacity. Intuitively, limited capacity improves
information accuracy, but has no expected cost when the principal is predisposed against proposals.
The loss of an option to accept a proposal does not impose a cost on the principal, as her expected
payo under unlimited capacity is the same as if she rejects both proposals.
3.4 Principal predisposed in favor and proposals most-likely good
We turn to the case in which the principal is predisposed in favor accepting (i.e.,  < ), and
proposals are most likely good (i.e.,  > 1
2). We have already shown that in equilibrium under
unlimited capacity, both agents produce weak signals and the principal always implements both
proposals. In this section, the principal continues to be predisposed in favor of both proposals, but
she only has the capacity to implement one of them. This introduces competitive pressure between
the agents who are now concerned about convincing the principal that their proposal is more likely
than the other proposal to be benecial. This pressure causes agents to provide persuasive evidence
under limited capacity as they compete for their proposal to have priority over the other proposal.
Because the principal is predisposed towards accepting, she is willing to implement any proposal
with a good signal realization. If only one proposal generates a favorable signal realization, then she
implements that proposal regardless of signal accuracy. If both proposals generate good realizations,
then the principal accepts the proposal with the more-accurate signal. For suciently large , the
14competitive incentives result in both agents producing fully informative signals in equilibrium with
1 = 2 = 1. When this is the case, the probability of generating favorable evidence is suciently
high that the agents prefer a tie at i = 1 rather than deviating to produce weak evidence with
the hope that the other agent generates an unfavorable signal realization. For lower , the fully-
informative equilibrium cannot be sustained and there exists both a pure strategy equilibrium in
which only one of the agents produce a fully-informative signal, and a symmetric mixed strategy
equilibrium with mixing between fully-informative and marginally-persuasive signals. We describe
these equilibria in Lemma 3.5.
Lemma 3.5 Under limited capacity with  <  and  > 1
2
 If   2 
p
2 then the unique Nash equilibrium is for each agent to produce a fully informative
signal, 1 = 2 = 1.
 If  < 2  
p
2 then many asymmetric Nash equilibria exist. In each Nash equilibrium, one
agent produces a fully revealing signal i = 1, and the other agent produces a weak signal,
j 2 [1
2;1   r]:
 If  < 2  
p
2 a symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium exists. Each agent chooses
i = 1   r with probability p =
2 4+2
2 2+1, and i = 1 with probability 1   p.
Under unlimited capacity, both agents provide weak signals. Here under limited capacity, there
always exists a pure strategy equilibrium in which at least one agent produces fully-informative
evidence, making the principal more informed than in the unlimited capacity environment. For low
enough , there also exists a mixed strategy equilibrium in which the principal is fully-informed
with positive probability. Thus, the principal always expects to be better informed under limited
capacity than under unlimited capacity.
Showing that the principal prefers limited to unlimited capacity is less straightforward here
compared to the previous section. Here, limited capacity constrains the principal to implement at
most one proposal even though from an ex ante perspective, she would like to implement both.
In order for the principal to prefer limited capacity, it must be that the expected benets of more
accurate evidence dominate the expected costs of rejecting one proposal with positive expected
value. This is the case when  is not too small relative to . The potential benets are summarized
in Proposition 3.6.
Proposition 3.6 When  <  and  > 1
2,
 In every pure strategy Nash equilibrium under limited capacity, at least one agent supplies a
fully revealing signal.
 In every mixed strategy Nash equilibrium under limited capacity, agents never supply less
accurate signals than in the unlimited capacity equilibrium, and supply fully-revealing signals
with non-zero probability.
15 For each , there exists a value ~  <  such that the principal prefers limited capacity to
unlimited capacity if and only if ~    < .
The benet of limited capacity is an increase in evidence quality (i.e. signal accuracy). However,
because she is predisposed in favor of the proposals, limited capacity has a cost: the principal is
constrained to implement fewer policies than she would like to implement if capacity were unlimited.
If proposals have relatively little downside risk (small ) and relatively high probability of being
good (high ), then the principal has a strong prior predisposition in favor of accepting proposals.
In this case, the option to implement a reform is very valuable. In this case, the informational
benets associated with limited capacity will not be large enough to overcome the costs of not
being able to support both proposals. When  is suciently close to , however, the informational
benets dominate the downside associated with the capacity constraint. As  approaches , the
principal's predisposition in favor of proposals becomes weaker, and the ex ante expected benet
from being able to implement a given proposal decreases. Decreasing the ex ante benet from
implementation in turn decreases the relative downside of limited capacity, which eventually allows
the informational benets of more accurate signals to dominate the costs from being constrained
on the number of proposals that can be accepted.
3.5 Summary of results
In the previous sections, we demonstrated the following main results.
1. In the majority of cases under unlimited capacity, agents produce less informative evidence
than the principal prefers. They strategically keep the principal less than fully informed since
doing so maximizes the probability that the principal implements their proposal.
2. When the principal has limited capacity to implement proposals, agents increase the quality
of evidence they produce as they compete with each other for priority. If the principal is
predisposed against proposals that are most likely bad, or predisposed in favor of proposals
that are most likely good, then more accurate signals are supplied under limited capacity
than under unlimited capacity. This leads to a more-informed principal.
3. For a signicant range of parameter values, the principal prefers (ex ante) to operate under
limited capacity, even if she has ex ante beliefs that both proposals are worthwhile. Here, the
informational benets of limited capacity outweigh the capacity costs.
Figure 1 illustrates the values of  and  under which the principal prefers limited capacity to
unlimited capacity. When  and  are in the shaded regions, the informational benets dominate
the expected costs of limited capacity.18
18The plot assumes that agents play the symmetric mixed strategy when
1
2 <  < 2 
p
2 and  > . Alternatively,
one may assume that they play the asymmetric pure strategy in this range. This choice makes little dierence for
the qualitative nature of the results.
16Figure 1: Range of parameters for which the principal prefers limited capacity
4 A Model with General Signals and Asymmetric Proposals
The previous section demonstrates that limited capacity often improves the informativeness of
evidence supplied by agents, and that this benet can outweigh the expected cost associated with
capacity constraints. In demonstrating this result, we constrained agents to choose their signals
from a simple parametric class and assumed that the prior beliefs about each proposal was identical.
These simplications allowed for a more-intuitive presentation of our results. In this section, we
present our results in a signicantly more general framework.
We expand the model of the last section in two ways. First, the prior beliefs associated with
the proposals need not be identical. Let i denote the ex ante probability that proposal i is good,
where i 2 (0;1) for i = H;L, and H  L. Second, we do not constrain the agents' choices of
signals to any particular parametric class. Here, agents have considerably more freedom to design
their signals.
Formally, signal (or experiment)  is a random variable, jointly distributed with proposal qual-
ity. We represent  as a pair of conditional random variables (g;b). If the true type of the
proposal is g, then a realization of random variable g is observed; otherwise a realization of b
is observed. We focus on random variables t; (t = g;b) for which the cumulative distribution
function has a countable number of discontinuities or mass points. Except at mass points, t ad-
mits a continuous density ft(x) which is strictly positive in some interval It. These are the only
requirements on t, and any random variable with such a structure is valid. The set of mass points
of random variable t is denoted Mt, a particular mass point in this set is denoted m
j
t, and the




t. St is the set of possible realizations of t, and is thus Mt [ It.
Thus the cumulative distribution function of any valid random variable can be written








17where H(x) is the Heaviside (or step) function. The associated density function pt(x) is dened
using the Dirac delta function, .19 Thus,





where ft(x) is continuous and equal to the derivative of Ft(x).20
The public realization of signal  (also called the outcome of the experiment) conveys infor-
mation about proposal quality. Because the true quality of each proposal is unknown, any signal
realization s 2 Sg [ Sb induces a posterior belief that the proposal is good, consistent with Bayes'
Rule. This posterior belief depends on the prior, the signal realization, and on the signal structure
itself. For any signal realization s 2 Sg [ Sb the principal's posterior belief that the proposal is
good given this signal realization is given by Bayes' rule:21
^ (s) =
pg(s)
pg(s) + (1   )pb(s)
Once the experiment is chosen by the agent, but before the outcome of the experiment is
realized, the value of the posterior belief ^ (s) is a random variable   = b () = Pr( = gj). This
random variable is thus the ex ante value of the principal's posterior belief. Observe that random
variable   is valid, has support conned to the unit interval, and (according to the law of total
expectation) has expected value equal to the prior belief, i.e. E [ ] = . In the next Lemma we
show that this is the only substantive restriction on random variable  .22
Lemma 4.1 Consider any valid random variable   with support conned to the unit interval and
expectation . If the prior belief is  then there exists a signal  for which the ex ante posterior
belief is  .
This proposition considerably simplies the analysis of this game. Instead of designing a signal
directly, each agent i simultaneously chooses a valid random variable  i, with support in the unit
interval and expectation i. This choice represents the ex ante value principal's posterior belief
about proposal quality, and is equivalent to a choice of any experiment that generates the same
distribution of posterior beliefs. We refer to this decision as a choice of a signal, although  
technically represents an entire payo-equivalent class of signals. Once both agents have chosen
their  i, these random variables are realized (i.e. the principal observes both the design and outcome
of the experiment, and rationally updates her beliefs). On the basis of the realized posterior beliefs,
19Of course this density is not a proper function; any statement that denes a random variable by specifying such
a density should be interpreted to mean that the cumulative distribution function of the variable is Pt(x).
20Since we are dealing with random variables, all of the statements throughout the paper are true up to variations
on sets of measure zero, a caveat which has no signicant implication for our results.
21Recall that
a1+b1(x)
a2+b2(x) is equal to
a1
a2 for x 6= 0 and is equal to
b1
b2 for x = 0
22In recent papers, Kamenica and Gentzkow (in press) use a related representation of signals to study a general class
of persuasion games, while Ganuza and Penalva (2010) use a related representation to study information disclosure
in auctions.
18the principal decides which proposals to accept, respecting the capacity constraints of the decision
making environment.
4.1 Unlimited Capacity
To analyze the game with unlimited capacity, observe rst that it is sequentially rational for the
principal to accept all proposals for which the realized posterior belief is at least as large as . An-
ticipating the principal's sequentially rational behavior, in equilibrium each agent chooses random
variable  i to maximize Pr( i  ) subject to E [ i] = i and Pr(0   i  1) = 1.
Observe rst that each agent always has the capability to choose a fully revealing signal:
Pr( i = 1) = i and Pr( i = 0) = 1   i
This signal completely reveals the quality of the proposal with which it is associated. After observing
the signal realization, the principal's beliefs are either one (she is sure the proposal is good) or zero
(she is sure the proposal is bad). Consequently, she always chooses the right course of action. From
the principal's perspective the fully revealing signal is optimal. If capacity is unlimited, however,
agents never supply fully revealing signals. In fact, their signals are eectively worthless to the
principal.
If the principal is predisposed in favor of implementing proposal i (i  ), then agent i chooses
a signal for which the entire support of  i is above . The simplest way to do that is to concentrate
all mass on i so that Pr( i = i) = 1, but any signal for which all realizations are above  achieves
the same result: each proposal is always accepted. We refer to such signal as weak. Consistent
with the results of the previous section, when the principal is predisposed in favor of accepting a
proposal and capacity is unlimited, the agent associated with that proposal supplies a signal that
never aects the principal's behavior.
If the principal is predisposed against proposal i, (i < ) then agent i must choose a persuasive
signal for a proposal to have a chance to be accepted. In this case, signals with non-zero probability
mass on posterior beliefs strictly above  are dominated.23 Similarly, any posterior distributions
which put non-zero probability mass on realizations between 0 and  are dominated.24 Thus, the
optimal signal concentrates mass on only two posterior beliefs, 0 and . In order to satisfy the
constraint on the expectation, the probability of generating the posterior belief  must be equal
to  =
i
 . Thus, the optimal signal requires only two realizations. One signal realization reveals
that the proposal is bad for certain, while the good realization leaves the principal just indierent
between accepting and rejecting the proposal. This is qualitatively similar to the results of Section
23By concentrating all mass above  in a mass point on , the agent generates a new random variable with the
same probability of being greater than or equal to  but with a smaller mean; the agent can then move additional
probability mass from realizations below  to the mass point on  in order to satisfy the constraint. Doing so increases
the agent's payo.
24By moving the probability mass between 0 and  into a mass point on 0, the agent can increase the probability
mass that is weakly above  without violating the constraint.
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Lemma 4.2 In equilibrium under unlimited capacity
 The principal accepts any proposal for which the realized posterior is greater than or equal to
.
 If   i, then agent i chooses a weak signal. On the equilibrium path, the principal accepts
the proposal.
E [wi] = i    and E [ui] = 1.
 If i <  then agent i chooses a signal such that  i is equal to  with probability
i
 and zero
with probability 1  
i
 . On the equilibrium path, the principal accepts if and only if  i = .




This result demonstrates that the conict of interest identied in the previous sections also
exists in this framework: although agents have the capacity to fully reveal the quality of their
proposals, in equilibrium they never choose to do so. Moreover, the evidence that they choose to
provide is eectively worthless to the principal. She would obtain the same expected payo if she
did not observe the signal realization and simply acted according to her prior belief.
4.2 Limited Capacity
In this section we establish the two main results. First, when capacity is limited, agents supply
more-informative equilibrium signals as they compete for priority. Second, for a wide range of
parameters, the benet of receiving more informative signals outweighs the expected cost of limited
capacity; in these cases, the principal expects to do better when capacity is limited.
To analyze the game with limited capacity, observe rst that the principal can accept at most
one proposal, even though she expects a positive payo from any proposal for which the realized
posterior belief is at least as large as . She will therefore choose to accept the proposal that
generates the highest posterior belief, provided this posterior belief exceeds .
In the rst stage of the game, agents H and L (H  L), simultaneously design valid random
variables  H; L with support conned to the unit interval. The mean of each player's random
variable is constrained:
E[ H] = H and E[ L] = L
These random variables represent the ex ante posterior beliefs induced by the agent's experiment.
Once both agents have made their choices, each random variable is realized; that is, the outcome of
the experiment is observed. The principal then implements the proposal that generates the highest
25The optimal signal in the parametric class of 3, however, is not optimal, because the principal's belief following
a bad realization is not zero, as it is under the optimal signal.
20realized posterior belief, provided this realization is greater than . If both random variables have
the same realization above  each proposal is equally likely to be implemented; if both random
variables have the same realization below , both proposals are rejected.26
In this game, agents want to make their proposals appear as good as possible, that is, they
want to concentrate as much mass as possible on high realizations of the posterior belief. However,
because of the feasibility constraint, any probability mass on realizations higher than i must be
oset by probability mass on realizations below i. Thus, reducing the prior belief associated with
a proposal limits the ability of the agent to reveal good information about the proposal.27
The normal form representation of this game is closely related to the normal form of a full-
information symmetric all-pay auction with the inclusion of mixed strategies, though important
dierences exist. In the standard symmetric full-information all-pay auction, each agent's strategy is
a choice of non-negative bid. The agent who chooses the highest bid wins a prize, but all participants
must pay their bids. The prize is equally valued by all players, and this value is common knowledge.
A mixed strategy in this game is a choice of random variable, which represents a player's random
bid. The player whose realized bid is highest wins the prize and, in expectation, pays a price equal
to the mean of his random bid.28 In our framework, agents also design random variables, and the
agent whose random variable generates the highest realiation has his proposal accepted (provided
a threshold is reached). Unlike an all-pay auction, the mean of each agent's strategy is constrained.
In our framework, the agent's strategy represents the posterior belief associated with his signal.
Bayesian rationality therefore requires that the expected value of an agent's strategy must be equal
the prior belief (which can be dierent for each agent).29 Despite this important distinction, our
analysis brings to light a connection between persuasion games and all-pay auctions.30
4.2.1 Equilibrium
In this section we describe the equilibrium of the game for all possible parameter values.31 Qual-
itatively, all of the equilibria of this game share a similar structure. The disadvantaged player, L,
26Conitzer and Wagman (2011) analyze a model related to our underlying framework. There are, however, a number
of features of our environment that are absent in their analysis: we allow for dierent means and a minimum outcome
simultaneously. Also, our random variables are conned to the unit interval. These dierences have signicant
implications for the results.
27Also observe that in the game we consider, the inclusion of mixed strategies does not expand the available
strategies for the players. Any mixed strategy in our setting is simply a mixture of valid random variables with the
same mean, which is equivalent to a new valid random variable with the same mean, which is an admissible \pure"
strategy.
28Thus, with two players, i's expected payo from choosing mixed strategy Bi against mixed strategy Bj in the
full information symmetric all pay auction is vPr(Bi > Bj) +
1
2vPr(Bi = Bj)   E[Bi]
29Applied to the all-pay auction setting, this requirement forces each bidder to adhere to a (potentially dierent)
budget constraint that holds in expectation only. While in the all pay auction agent i chooses best response Bi
to maximize vPr(Bi > Bj) +
1
2vPr(Bi = Bj)   E[Bi], in our game player i's best response maximizes Pr( i >
 j) +
1
2Pr( i =  j) subject to E[ i] = i
30Less substantial dierences also exist. Unlike the standard treatment of the full information all-pay auction,
in the game we consider there is both a maximum possible realization (equivalent to a bid cap) and a minimum
realization required for the proposal to be allocated (equivalent to a reservation price).
31A detailed derivation of each equilibrium can be found in the appendix.
21chooses a strategy that consists of some combination of the following: a mass point on zero, uniform
mixing between  and some value   no greater than one, and a mass point on one. The advantaged
player, H, chooses a strategy that consists of some combination of the following: a mass point on
zero, a mass point on , uniform mixing between  and the same  , and a mass point on one.
Lemma 4.3 In every equilibrium, agents' strategies are of the following type:
 H =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
0 with probability fH0
 with probability fH1
U[;  ] with probability fH2





0 with probability fL0
U[;  ] with probability fL1
1 with probability fL2
fH0 + fH1 + fH2 + fH3 = fL0 + fL1 + fL2 = 1
Within this structure, the nature of the equilibrium depends critically on the strength of com-
petition between the agents. The severity of competition depends on the interplay of two related
factors. The rst factor is the optimism of the prior beliefs associated with each proposal; speaking
roughly, as the prior beliefs for both proposals increase so that both proposals appear better ex
ante, competition between the agents becomes more erce. As a response, the agents supply more
valuable signals to the principal. The severity of competition, is undermined, however, by the
degree of asymmetry between the two prior beliefs H and L. When this asymmetry is high, the
initial advantage of player H is high. This initial advantage undermines competition between the
agents.
Consistent with this discussion, we expect that if both proposals are very likely to be good and
the asymmetry between the proposals is low, then competition between agents is likely to be erce.
Fierce competition, in turn, forces agents to supply fully revealing signals. Indeed, this intuition is
borne out by the following lemma.
Lemma 4.4 If L  2 2
2  then it is a Nash Equilibrium for each player to choose a fully revealing
strategy.
On the other hand, if H is high, and L is relatively low, the erce competition of the previous
proposition is somewhat undone by the degree of asymmetry between the proposals. From the
perspective of agent L, in order to have a hope of proposal acceptance, he must still supply a fully
revealing signal, however, agent H need not supply a fully revealing signal. Because it is so likely
that proposal L is rejected when its quality is discovered, agent H does not need to ever reveal
that his proposal is bad to stay competitive. That is, the posterior associated with a bad signal
realization does not need to be zero for the advantaged agent. We refer to a signal that concentrates
22probability mass on only two posteriors, 0 and  as a quasi-revealing signal.32 Whenever, H is
high, and L is relatively low, the advantaged agent chooses a quasi-revealing signal in equilibrium,
rather than a fully revealing signal.
Lemma 4.5 If L  2 2
2  and H  2 2+2
2  then it is a Nash Equilibrium for player L to use
a fully revealing signal, and for player H to use a quasi-revealing signal: fH1 =
1 H
1  ; fH3 =
H 
1  and fH0 = fH2 = 0.
Next, we consider the equilibria that exist for other values of the prior beliefs. In these cases,
competition is somewhat muted compared to the fully revealing case; in addition to sometimes
putting positive probability mass on signal realizations that fully reveal the proposal type, in
equilibrium agents put positive probability mass on posterior beliefs in an interval [;  ]. We rst





L   and L  1
2(1   2) then the strategies of Lemma 4.3 constitute an
equilibrium for




fH0 = 1   fH1   fH2, fH1 =
H   L

, fH2 = 1  
q
2
L + 2   L

, fH3 = 0
fL0 = 1   fL1, fL1 = fH2, fL2 = 0
Thus, we nd that for small degrees of asymmetry between the proposals, and for relatively small
values of both prior beliefs, both agents send signals that sometimes reveal that their proposal is
bad. In addition, the posterior belief about each proposals is uniformly distributed between  and
some maximum realization    1 with equal probability for both proposals. The only dierence
between the agent's strategies, is that agent H's signal is less likely to reveal that his proposal is





L   and 1
2(1   2)  L  2 2
2  , then the strategies of Lemma 4.3
constitute an equilibrium for








    
2    
, fH3 =
2   2 
2    
fL0 = 1   fL1   fL2, fL1 = fH2, fL2 = fH3
From the lemma, we see that the equilibrium is dierent in two ways from the case discussed
previously. First, because both priors are higher than in the previous case, both agents are able
to send signals that sometimes reveal that the proposals are good; that is, both ex ante posterior
beliefs have mass points on realization 1. Second, the upper end of the support of the uniform






23  in this case is just two minus its counterpart in the previous proposition. This equilibrium has
a similar property to the previous one: the only dierence between agents strategies is agent H's
mass point on .
We turn now to the case of large dierences in prior beliefs about the two proposals. As in
the previous case, we present two propositions, one for the case of relatively pessimistic priors, and
another for the case of relatively optimistic priors. Whenever the dierence in prior beliefs is large,
the advantaged agent never chooses a signal that ever reveals that his proposal is bad for certain.
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H  1
2(1+2), then the strategies of Lemma 4.3 constitute an
equilibrium for




fH0 = 0, fH1 = 1   fH2, fH2 =
2(H   )
    
, fH3 = 0
fL0 = 1   fL1, fL1 =
2L
  + 
, fL2 = 0
This equilibrium is somewhat reminiscent of the high asymmetry, high H equilibrium in which
agent L supplies a fully revealing signal, and agent H supplies a quasi-revealing signal. Unlike that
scenario, however, neither prior belief is high enough that the agent can actually put probability
mass on posterior belief realization 1. In equilibrium it is not worth it for an agent to send a
signal that would actually reveal a good proposal, as the probability that the proposal is good is
low. Instead, of concentrating mass on one, the agents spread it uniformly in an interval from  to
some threshold    1. For intermediate priors and high asymmetry, agents begin to reveal good
proposals, as demonstrated by the following lemma:





2(1+2)  H  2 2+2
2  , then the following strategies consti-
tute an equilibrium:




fH0 = 0, fH1 = 1   fH2   fH3, fH2 =
    
2    
, fH3 =
2   2 
2    
,
fL0 = 1   fL1   fL2, fL1 =
2L(    )
(2    )2   2, fL2 =
4L(1    )
(2    )2   2
Qualitatively, the only dierence between the intermediate prior case and the low prior case is the
appearance of the mass points on 1. As in the case of small dierences in prior beliefs, the mixing
threshold   is two minus the threshold for small priors.
We illustrate the six propositions that characterize the Nash equilibrium of the rst stage game
between agents in Figure 2.
We would like to highlight two key points about these equilibria. First, as agents compete,
probability mass is spread: the probability of posterior realizations above  is non-zero in all
equilibria. Second, in all equilibria, the probability of either accepting proposal L or rejecting both
24Figure 2: Equilibrium Cases. Labels follow propositions in alphabetical order.
proposals is non-zero. While agent H does possess an advantage, it is never the case that in any
equilibrium the principal always prefers to accept proposal H.
4.3 The Information Benet of Limited Capacity
We now show that under limited capacity agents supply more informative signals than under
unlimited capacity. To establish this result we apply results from Ganuza and Penalva (2010).
These authors dene a convex order among random variables.
Denition 4.1 Y is greater than Z in the convex order if for all convex real-valued function
;E[(Y )]  E[(Z)] provided the expectation exists.
These authors then use this denition to dene a notion of signal precision that they call integral
precision. We adapt their denition to our setting.
Denition 4.2 Signal 1 is more integral precise than signal 2 if the ex ante posterior belief
induced by 1 is greater than the ex ante posterior belief induced by 2 in the convex order.
The authors then show that with a binary type space (such as ours), the notion of integral precision
is equivalent to Blackwell informativeness. That is, for a given prior, 1 is more integral precise
than 2, if and only if 1 is Blackwell-sucient for 2 (i.e. 1 is more informative than 2).34
In order to demonstrate that each agent's equilibrium signal under limited capacity is more
Blackwell informative than his equilibrium signal under unlimited capacity it is enough to show that
the agent's equilibrium strategy under limited commitment dominates his strategy under unlimited
commitment in the convex order. In our case, the agent's strategies have the same mean; therefore,
341 is Blackwell sucient for 2 if 2 is a garbling of 1. In this case, any decision maker prefers to observe
signal 1 to signal 2.
25the convex order is equivalent to the reverse of second order stochastic dominance.35 Thus, if each
agent's equilibrium strategy under limited capacity is second order stochastic dominated by his
equilibrium strategy under unlimited commitment, then both signals are more Blackwell informative
under limited commitment than under unlimited commitment. In the next proposition, we establish
that this is indeed the case.
Proposition 4.10 Each agent's equilibrium strategy under limited capacity is more Blackwell in-
formative than the agent's equilibrium strategy under unlimited capacity.36
This proposition illustrates the informational benet of limited capacity. Because agents com-
pete (indirectly) under the limited capacity system, they choose to supply signals that are more
informative about the true quality of their proposals. This result is stronger than the similar result
in Section 3, where it held when the principal's predisposition was aligned with the priors.
Although agents supply more informative signals under limited capacity, the principal is not
always better o because her actions are constrained: she may not be able to accept a proposal
that she expects is benecial. In the next section, we show that the benets of limited capacity
frequently outweigh the costs; the principal frequently does better under a limited capacity system.
4.4 Limited Capacity is Preferred
As demonstrated in the previous section, limited capacity comes with benets, but it also comes
with costs. If both proposals generate posterior beliefs that are greater than , under limited
capacity the principal is only able to accept one, although she expects to benet by accepting both.
In this section, we show that the benets of limited capacity often outweigh the costs; in these
cases, the principal prefers to have with limited capacity.
If H  , then it is not dicult to see that the principal prefers limited capacity. In this case,
under unlimited capacity, the principal's expected payo is zero, equal to her payo of rejecting
both proposals. Recall that the principal's expected payo of accepting a proposal which she
believes is good with probability  is    . In the limited capacity equilibrium, the probability
that the largest of the two realizations of the posterior belief is strictly greater than  is non-zero
(given that L > 0). Thus, there is a positive probability that the principal accepts a proposal that
brings her a strictly positive expected payo. Her expected payo in this equilibrium is therefore
strictly positive.
Intuitively, if the principal is predisposed against both proposals and capacity is unlimited, the
agents supply signals which leave the principal (at best) indierent between accepting and rejecting.
Thus there is no cost associated with limited capacity, but because limited capacity motivates the
agents to supply signals that are more informative, it is strictly benecial and always preferred.
35If E[Y]=E[Z] then Y second order stochastic dominates Z if and only if for every concave function  E[(Y )] 
E[(Z)]. As the negative of a concave function is convex, strategy  1 is second order stochastic dominated by strategy
 2 if and only if  1 is greater than  2 in the convex order.
36Here we assume that if the principal is predisposed in favor of an agent's proposal, the agent supplies an unin-
formative signal.
26A related argument demonstrates that the principal continues to prefer limited capacity when
L    H. With these parameters under unlimited capacity, the principal always accepts
proposal H and is at best indierent between accepting and rejecting proposal L, resulting in
expected payo H   . If the principal observes the equilibrium signals from the limited capacity
game, but is forced to accept H (and reject L) her payo will be H   , identical to her payo
in the unlimited capacity equilibrium. In the limited capacity equilibrium, however, the principal
is not constrained to always accept H and reject L; in fact, the probability that in the limited
equilibrium the principal chooses to accept L or reject both proposals is non-zero. Her expected
payo in the limited capacity equilibrium therefore exceeds her payo when she is constrained,
which is H   .
We have therefore demonstrated that the principal strictly prefers the equilibrium with limited
capacity to the equilibrium with unlimited capacity whenever L  , independent of H. Because
the equilibrium changes in a continuous way as the parameters change, there is some region in which
L >  in which the principal also prefers the equilibrium with limited capacity. We therefore have
the following proposition:
Proposition 4.11 If L;H  , then the principal's expected payo always is strictly higher under
limited capacity compared to unlimited capacity. If H > , then there exists a value ~ L 2 (;H)
such that the principal's expected payo is strictly higher under limited capacity when L < ~ L.
This region is illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Limited capacity is preferred in the shaded region.
275 Applications
5.1 Legislative Decision Making
Limited capacity is a reality of the legislative process. An appropriation committee may not be
willing to allot individual legislators funds to support all potential earmarks they believe benecial.
For example, Frisch and Kelly (2010, 2011) present evidence that during the 2006 budget cycle the
Chairman of the US House Appropriations Subcommittee for Labor-Health and Human Services
allowed each rank-and-le member of the U.S. House to request up to $400,000 in earmark funding
from his subcommittee. The allotted amount increased systematically for subcommittee members,
principals in at-risk districts and those in leadership positions. If a legislator requested a larger
amount of funding from the subcommittee, the funding was rejected or cut down to the allotted
amount. This process means that legislators must carefully decide for which earmark projects to
request funding. Legislators often respond to their own limited capacity to request earmarks by
setting up an application process through which potential beneciaries may apply, and lobby for
funding.
Similarly, time and sta constraints may prevent a politician from introducing legislation on
each policy proposal she or her constituents support. In an attempt to convince the legislator that
its policy proposal is worth the legislator's time and eort, an interest group can collect evidence
conrming the merits of its proposal. Our story is consistent with Hall and Deardor (2006)'s story
of \lobbying as legislative subsidy," where special interest and lobby groups promise assistance (e.g.,
provide help conducting research or writing legislation) to time constrained politicians in an eort
to convince the politicians to take up their cause. In our model, some of the assistance|conducting
research and helping the politician better understand the implications of a policy|may come before
the legislator decides which policies to pursue.
We have shown that limited legislative capacity can entice special interest groups to produce
more informative evidence about the merits of their projects or policies. These constraints have
the potential to improve politician (and constituent) wellbeing, even though they may sometimes
prevent good policies from being implemented or benical earmark projects from being funded.
5.2 Grant Writing
The second motivating example from the introduction involved grant writing. A funding organi-
zation must choose which research or community development proposals to accept. If the funding
organization could back all projects that it believes worthy of funding, then applicants with ex ante
promising projects have no incentive to produce additional evidence about the merits of its project,
and applicants with projects the funding organization is predisposed not to accept will collect just
enough evidence about the quality of their project to change the funding decision in their favor.
Funding organizations, however, rarely have the ability to back all projects. The organization
often must decide which of the promising projects is most-promising. The Robert Wood Johnson
Foundation makes this clear on their website:
28\Due to the volume of proposals we receive, many excellent projects that meet our
criteria still do not receive funding."
One way that applicants make their proposals stand out is by producing evidence about the
likely success or contributions of their project. For researchers, this means providing a more-
detailed description of their qualications, research methods and policy implications, or producing
preliminary results. Before applying for funding for a large scale eld experiment, for example,
researchers often run smaller trials. The number of treatments and the number of subjects in their
experiments aect the informativeness of the trials about the eventual success of the project. Even
in theoretical work, the researchers decide whether to develop a formal model and preliminary
propositions prior to submitting an application.
The analysis shows how competition for limited funding between researchers leads to the alloca-
tion of funding to projects that are on average more promising than those funded by an organization
that is able to back all projects it believes benecial. Although the budget limitation may result in
fewer promising projects being funded, the informational benets of limited capacity often outweigh
the potential costs, and the funding organization may in fact prefer a limited budget. Increasing
an organization's budget may make the organization worse o.
5.3 College Admissions
The process of admission to elite undergraduate colleges has become increasingly competitive.
With the increased competition has come a greater emphasis on extracurricular activities. Our
model suggests a reason for this. A college admissions ocer at an elite school wants to admit
students who are most-likely high ability. Applicants provide a partially informative signal about
their ability through their high school grade point average. A high GPA, however, is not perfect
evidence that the student is high ability if moderate-ability students have a chance of achieving a
high GPA through extra work and tutoring. Students can devote time to extra curricular activities,
which communicates to the admissions ocer that they maintained their GPA while devoting time
to other non-studious activities. Devoting time to the other activities makes maintaining a high
GPA less likely for moderate ability students, and thus improves the informativeness of a good
academic outcome.37
5.4 Firm Expansion and Product Launch
A rm executive may be looking to expand operations, and not know which divisions oer the
most-promise for expansion. The capital available for expansion may be enough to fund expansion
for only one division, even if the executive believes that multiple divisions are worth expanding.
Prior to choosing which division to expand, the division managers may propose strategic plans
37One of the authors is reminded of his high school valedictorian, who got a perfect score on the SAT, twice. He
took the exam a second time to demonstrate that the perfect score he earned on the rst attempt was no accident,
increasing the informativeness of his signal.
29and compile veriable evidence about the protability of the expansion of their divisions. Our
results suggest that limitations to the amount of funds available for investment may lead to better
investment decisions regarding these funds. That is, limited resources causes competition between
the division managers, incentivizing them to produce more informative information about the future
plans and protability of their divisions.
A similar story may be told in which a rm is limited in its capacity to introduce new products
to the market, and must decide which successful R&D projects to mass produce. Limited capacity
may improve the quality of evidence produced by project or division managers about the quality
or marketability of their respective products. The analysis suggests that a rm manager who is
constrained in the number of divisions she can expand, or the number of products she can put into
production may be make better decisions and be better o than a manager with unconstrained
capacity.
5.5 Product Information and Pre-purchase Sampling
Firms produce dierent, independent products. Both producers and consumers may be uncertain
about the match quality between a given product and an individual consumer's needs. To enable
consumers to learn about the potential enjoyment they will receive from a purchase, the sellers
can allow consumers to interact with a good prior to making a purchase decision (e.g., hands on
interaction with iPads at the Apple Store, test drives at car dealerships, free samples at a chocolate
shop). The more interaction the rm allows prior to purchase, the more informative the consumer's
impression is about the good. If consumers are without budget constraints, the sellers would need
to provide consumers with just enough interaction with the products to convince them that it is
most-likely in their best interest to make a purchase. When consumers are budget constrained,
however, convincing them that the project is most-likely worthwhile is not enough. Producers
must convince consumers that their product is likely a better purchase than the other products.
Our model predicts that limited consumer budgets lead to increased pre purchase interactions
with products, which makes for a better-informed purchase decision. Our analysis illustrates that
consumers may be better o when they can aord to purchase fewer products. Budget constraints
lead sellers to provide consumers with more pre-purchase interaction, increasing the probability
that the consumers buy products they nd worthwhile.
5.6 FDA Approval
The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulates pharmaceuticals. Included in this is
the control of whether drugs are approved for over-the-counter or prescription use. To gain FDA
approval, drug companies conduct clinical trials to provide sucient evidence that their produce is
safe and eective for human use. There is currently no ocial limit to the number of new drugs that
the FDA can approve every year. Our analysis shows that limiting the number of annual new drug
approvals could theoretically increase consumer wellbeing. This would be because competition for
a limited number of approvals could incentivize drug companies to conduct more-extensive reviews
30of their product before applying for FDA approval. Of course, we are ignoring the nancial costs
and potential health eects of increased time to market associated with additional trials, and the
political and public relations problems that may arise from not approving drugs that the evidence
suggests will most-likely save or improve lives.
6 Conclusion
We develop a model of persuasion in which a principal decides whether to implement each of two
independent proposals (e.g., earmark requests, policy reforms, grant funding). Agents advocating
on behalf of the proposals can produce evidence about the quality of their respective proposal,
enabling the principal to make a more informed decision. The principal prefers the agents to
produce the most-informative evidence possible. Agents, however, strategically choose evidence
quality to maximize the probability that the principal implements their proposal (maximizing their
own payos rather than the principal's payo). When the principal can implement all proposals she
believes are worthwhile (i.e., the case of unlimited capacity), the agents typically will not produce
fully informative evidence, leaving the principal less than fully informed about proposal quality.
Within this framework, we show that the principal can often be both better informed and better
o when she is constrained in the number of proposals she can implement. When the principal
is unable to implement all proposals, the agents are concerned about their proposal being given
priority over the alternatives in the event that the principal would like to implement more proposals
than she has capacity. If the principal observes evidence in favor of two proposals, but can only
implement one of them, then she will give priority to the one with the more-informative evidence|
that is, the one she is more certain is high quality. The agents react to this by increasing the quality
of the evidence they produce. Under limited capacity, the agents produce more informative evidence
compared to the case in which the legislator had unlimited capacity to implement proposals. We
then derive reasonable conditions under which this informational benet dominates the expected
cost, and the principal prefers to be limited in the number of proposals she can implement.
The model highlights an informational benet of limited capacity and competitive advocacy that
has not been focused on before in the literature. The framework may be applied to understand
incentives in a variety of settings, lending insight into informational lobbying, consumer sampling,
college admissions and preliminary research in grant applications, among others.
7 Appendix
7.1 Detailed analysis the symmetric agent, binary signal model under limited
capacity
7.1.1 Predisposed against and proposals most-likely bad
In this case,  <  and  < 1
2. We rst characterize principal behavior under limited capacity. Since the
principal is predisposed against accepting, she certainly rejects any proposal for which the signal is weak or
31the realization is bad. If only one proposal generates a favorable signal from a persuasive distribution, then
the principal implements that proposal. If both signals generate good realizations, she accepts the proposal
she believes is more likely to be good; that is the one with the more-accurate signal quality. Formally:
 If i 2 [1
2;r) and j 2 [1
2;r) reject both proposals.
 If i 2 [r;1] and j 2 [1
2;r) accept proposal i if and only if si = G. Always reject proposal j.
 If i 2 [r;1] and j 2 [r;1] and si = B and sj = B, reject both proposals.
 If i 2 [r;1] and j 2 [r;1] and si = G and sj = B, accept proposal i.
 If i 2 [r;1] and j 2 [r;1] and si = G and sj = G, accept proposal i if i > j and accept each
proposal with equal probability if i = j.
This illustrates the impact of limited capacity. By supplying a more accurate signal, an agent gives his issue
priority: if both signals are persuasive, and both realizations are good, his proposal will be the one imple-
mented. Because the proposals are most-likely bad, however, increasing accuracy reduces the probability of
generating a good signal. In equilibrium, agents trade o the benet of taking priority against the reduction
in the probability of generating a good signal.
Given the principal's strategy, we construct each agent's rst period expected payo as a function of
both signal accuracies. Suppose agents choose i;j:
if i 2 [1
2;r) then ui (i;j) = 0
if i 2 [r;1] and i > j then E [ui (i;j)] =  (i)
if i 2 [r;1] and i < j then E [ui (i;j)] =  (i)(1    (j))







Each of these payos is straightforward to understand. If an agent produces a weak signal, his proposal
is rejected. If an agent produces a persuasive signal with higher accuracy than the other agent, his issue
is decided on its merits. It is implemented if and only if it generates a good signal. If agent i produces a
persuasive signal that is less accurate than the other agent, his proposal is accepted only if it generates a
good signal realization and the other proposal generates a bad realization. Finally, if both agents produce
persuasive signals of identical accuracy, then proposal i is accepted if si = G and sj = B: If both proposals
generate good signal realizations, then each proposal is accepted with equal probability. A weak signal is
strictly dominated by producing a marginally persuasive signal and would never be part of an equilibrium
strategy.
We start by characterizing the unique pure strategy equilibrium of this stage game, i = j = 1. Suppose
that agent j chooses a fully informative signal, j = 1. In this case, the probability that proposal j generates







Any choice of i 2 [r;1) gives expected payo  (i)(1   ). Since  < 1
2, function  () is strictly decreasing
and an agent's optimal choice of  2 [r;1) is  = r, which gives expected payo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The above denition of ^  describes the value of ^  from Lemma 3.3. No other symmetric pure strategy
equilibrium exists, as a deviation to b i = j + " gives higher expected payo than i = j. No asymmetric
pure strategy equilibrium exists, as the agent supplying the signal with higher accuracy could always benet
by slightly reducing his signal accuracy.
If both agents choose  = 1, the most protable deviation for an agent is to produce a marginally
persuasive signal, ceding full priority to the other agent but maximizing the probability of generating a good
signal realization. Such a deviation is protable if the probability of generating a good realization when
choosing the marginally persuasive signal is high; this in turn is the case when the marginally persuasive
signal accuracy r is close to 1
2. When the stakes  increase, the cost of mistakenly implementing a bad
proposal is high; thus the principal requires a more informative signal in order to overturn her predisposition
towards rejection. In other words, increases in  increase the value of r. Thus a suciently high  ensures
that both agents produce fully-informative signals in equilibrium.
Next, we provide a partial characterization of all mixed strategy equilibria of the rst stage game. This
partial characterization is based on several straightforward observations about the nature of the equilibrium.
For our main result, the partial characterization is sucient. Consider a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium
in which each agent's signal accuracy is the realization of random variable A. We assume that this mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium involves randomization, i.e. it is not the pure strategy equilibrium 1 = 2 = 1
already characterized.
Lemma 7.1 Under the limited capacity legislative system with  < q and  < 1
2, in any symmetric
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the stage game, the following four properties must hold:
1. Weak signals are outside of the support of A.
2. The only possible mass point is  = 1.
3. The smallest signal accuracy inside the support of A is r.
4. If disjoint intervals [x1;x2] and [x3;x4] are in the support of A, then the entire interval [x1;x4]
is inside the support of A.
Proof.
(1) Uninformative signals are strictly dominated.
(2) If the mixed strategy equilibrium strategy has a mass point at a, then it can be described as
follows: with probability  each agent selects  = a. With probability 1  each agent draws a signal
accuracy from CDF F (x) (which is possibly discontinuous itself, i.e. has mass points). Consider the
following deviation for agent i. With probability  agent selects  = a + ". With probability 1   
agent i draws signal accuracy from CDF F (x) With probability (1   )
2 both choose to draw from
F (x), in this case the payo is unchanged. With probability (1   ) the other agent plays his mass
point, while the deviating agent plays from F (x). In this case the deviator's payo is unchanged.
With probability (1   ) the other agent plays from F (x) while the deviator plays the mass point.
Because the mass point under the deviation is arbitrarily close to the original mass point the payo
is also arbitrarily close to the original payo. With probability 2 both players play the mass point.






. Thus for small
values of " this deviation causes a discrete increase in the agent's expected payo. When " is very
small this increase is approximately
(a)
2
2 > 0. This deviation is protable. The only value of a for
which no such deviation exists is a = 1.
(3) Imagine that ; the lowest element of the support of A, were strictly greater than r. Compare  to
r. As there is no mass point at , with probability 1 the other agent's signal accuracy is strictly higher
than both  and r. Therefore, the expected payo from choosing  for certain is  ()(1   E [ (j)]),
while the payo to choosing r is  (r)(1   E [ (j)]). Because  < 1
2,  (x) is decreasing; hence,
 (r)(1   E [ (j)]) >  ()(1   E [ (j)])
Therefore, if the smallest element of the support is larger than r, then playing the mixed strategy is
dominated by choosing r.
(4) Imagine that disjoint intervals [x1;x2] and [x3;x4] are in the support of A, but interval (x2;x3)
is outside the support of A. Compare playing x2 to x3. Both of these signal accuracies have the
same probability of being larger than the other player's accuracy, and both accuracies have the same
probability of being less than the other player's signal accuracy. However, in both of these cases, the
payo associated with pure strategy x2 is higher than the payo associated with x3. This contradicts
the indierence condition.
This Lemma is not dicult to understand. As weak signals are dominated they are outside of the
support of the mixed strategy equilibrium. No interior mass point can exist in a symmetric mixed strategy
equilibrium; if both strategies have the same mass point, then agents choose the same accuracy with positive
probability. If both proposals generate good realizations and the accuracies are the same (which happens
with nonzero probability), a tie occurs, and each proposal is accepted with probability 1
2. By just slightly
increasing the accuracy associated with the mass point, an agent can assure that all ties break in his favor,
which increases his payo by a discrete amount, and is therefore protable. The only possible mass point
is therefore at  = 1. If the smallest signal accuracy in the support of the mixed strategy  were strictly
greater than r, then whether agent i chose i = r or chose i =, his accuracy is always less than the
accuracy of the other agent, which always gives the other agent decision making priority. Thus whether
i = r or i =, proposal i is implemented if sj = B and si = G. However, because increased accuracy
reduces the probability of generating a good signal (and does not aect the probability that sj = B), the
signal with i = r has a higher probability that si = G. Therefore if > r then choosing i = r dominates
the mixed strategy. The intuition for the last part of the Lemma is similar: under the assumptions, pure
strategies x2 and x3 give an agent the same priority in the decision making process, but accuracy x2 is more
likely to generate a good signal realization.
Only two types of mixed strategies are consistent with Lemma 7.1. The rst type of mixed strategy
calls for agents to choose their signal strengths from a continuous CDF with support on [r;  ], where    1.
The second type of mixed strategy equilibrium calls for agents choosing signal strengths from a CDF with
continuous support on [r;  ] and mass point on 1. Under both feasible mixed strategies, both agents choose
signal qualities greater than r with probability one, since the mixed strategy CDFs do not allow for a mass
point on r and r is the smallest accuracy in the support. Compared to the case of unlimited capacity, here
limited capacity almost certainly results in a more informed principal. Because the principal has an expected
payo of zero in this case under unlimited capacity, and her expected payos are strictly higher here under
limited capacity, she strictly prefers limited to unlimited capacity.
34Although it is not essential for the main results, we believe that a complete characterization of the mixed
strategy equilibria lead to a better understanding of the eects limited capacity has on agent incentives.
Below, we complete the characterization of the mixed strategy equilibrium for  < ; < 1
2 in the cases in
which no pure strategy equilibrium exists. In an interest of space, and because the characterization is not
required for the results in the body of the paper, we do not walk through the derivation. Dene  1 and  2
as follows,
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the unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the rst stage game is characterized as follows. Each
agent chooses his signal accuracy i equal to the realization of random variable A with support on
[r;  1]. The density of A is given by
f (x) =
 ( 1)(1   2)
 (x)
3 .
Each agent's equilibrium payo is given by Eui =  ( 1).














32   6 + 2
22   5 + 2
the unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the rst stage game is characterized as follows. With
probability  =
2 2(A)
2 2(A) an agent chooses a fully informative signal  = 1. . With probability 1 ;
 is equal to the realization of random variable A with support on [r;  2] The density of A is given by
f (x) =  ( 2)2 1   2




Each agent's equilibrium payo is given by  ( 2)(1   ).
 For larger  the Nash equilibrium is the pure strategy equilibrium derived previously.
7.1.2 Predisposed in favor and proposals most-likely good
Here we derive equilibria for the case when  <  and  > 1
2. The following summarizes the principal's
equilibrium strategies, as discussed in the body of the paper:
 If si = G and sj = B, the principal accepts proposal i:
35 If s1 = s2 = G. the principal accepts proposal i if i > j. If i = j accept each proposal with
probability 1
2.
 If s1 = s2 = B, the principal accepts proposal i if and only if i < j and i  1 r. If i = j  1 r
accept each proposal with probability 1
2.
Given the principal's strategy, it is straightforward to construct each agent's expected payo as a function
of both signal accuracies. Suppose agents choose i;j,
if i > j then E [ui (i;j)] =  (i)
if i 2 (1   r;1] and i < j then E [ui (i;j)] =  (i)(1    (j))
if i 2 [1
2;1   r] and i < j then E [ui (i;j)] = 1    (j)






if i 2 [1
2;1   r] and i = j then E [ui (i;j)] = 1
2.
If agent i produces a more accurate signal than agent j, proposal i is implemented if and only if proposal
i generates a good signal. If agent i produces a less informative signal than agent j and this signal is
persuasive, then proposal i is implemented if and only if issue j generates a bad signal and i generates
a good signal. On the other hand if i's signal is less informative than j and is also weak, then proposal
i is implemented if and only if j generates a bad signal. If both agents produce a signal with the same
persuasive accuracy, then proposal i is implemented whenever si = G and sj = B; furthermore, if both
proposals generate good realizations, each is accepted with equal probability. Finally, if both agents produce
the same weak signal, then i is implemented if it generates a good realization and j does not; otherwise each
proposal is implemented with probability 1
2: In this case, the probability of i being implemented is just











As in the previous case, an agent who supplies a more informative signal receives priority in the decision
making process. Furthermore, because accuracy is success enhancing, it is easy to see that supplying a fully
informative signal i = 1 is a best reply to any less than fully informative signal j < 1.38 Thus, in any
pure strategy Nash equilibrium, at least one agent supplies a fully informative signal. If the best reply to a
fully informative signal is also a fully informative signal, then 1 = 2 = 1 is the unique Nash equilibrium
of the rst stage game. This is not always the case, however. If agent i replies to a fully informative signal







When both agents produce fully-informative signals, both proposals have equal priority, and a good signal
realization is required for a proposal to be accepted. Rather than supply a fully informative signal as a
response to a fully informative signal, agent i may prefer to produce a weak signal. In doing so, agent i cedes
priority to agent j; however, if proposal j generates a bad signal realization, proposal i will be implemented,
regardless of i's signal realization. If a good signal realization is not suciently likely when  = 1 (i.e. 
is not large enough), an agent may prefer to sacrice priority in order to remove the requirement that his
38Suppose j < 1. Because  () is increasing, i = 1 is clearly better than any other i > j. Among accuracies







2 and  () is increasing,  () >
1
2. Hence 1    (), the payo to any weak signal, is less than
1
2,
which is itself less than the payo to a fully revealing signal.
36proposal generate a good realization in order to be implemented.
A fully revealing signal from each agent 1 = 2 = 1 is the unique Nash equilibrium of the rst stage







 1    ()   2  
p
2.
If, on the other hand,  < 2  
p





. Because agent j prefers to produce a fully-informative signal whenever agent i produces a
weak signal, a multitude of asymmetric equilibria exist. In each of these equilibria one of the agents supplies
a fully revealing signal and the other agent supplies a weak signal.
There also exists the possibility of mixed strategy equilibria. Consider the following mixed strategy:
with probability p an agent chooses i = 1 r, and with probability 1 p an agent chooses a fully revealing
signal i = 1. First we show that for an appropriate choice of p, an agent receives the same expected payo
from choosing pure strategies i = 1   r and i = 1 against this mixed strategy. We then verify that this
expected payo is not less than the expected payo of choosing any other pure strategy  2 [1
2;1) against
this mixed strategy.
If agent i anticipates that agent j uses this mixed strategy, i's payo from choosing i = 1   r is
1




.The value of p for
which the agent is indierent between these pure strategies is given by equation:
1
2
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2] ! p 2 (0;1].










 = 2  
p
2 ! u =
p
2   1.
To complete the derivation, it must be shown that no pure strategy in the interior of the interval  2 [1
2;1);
if played for certain, gives a higher payo than u against this mixed strategy. Consider the payo to pure
strategy e i < 1   r; to the payo of playing i = 1   r for certain. If the other agent plays j = 1, then
the two strategies give the same payo 1   . However, if the other agent plays j = 1   r; then by also
playing i = 1   r agent i receives payo 1
2. By playing e i agent i receives payo 1    (1   r). Because
1 r > 1





2. Thus 1  (1   r) < 1
2. Any pure strategy
e i < 1   r has a smaller expected payo than i = 1   r against this mixed strategy. Next we compare the
payo of playing pure strategy 1   r < e i < 1 to playing pure strategy i = 1 against this mixed strategy.
If the other agent chooses j = 1 r then playing e i < 1 is dominated by playing i = 1. If the other agent
plays j = 1, then the payo to playing i = 1 is    1
22: The payo to playing e i < 1 is  (e i)(1   ): As




2 >  (1   ) >  ()(1   )
Therefore playing any pure strategy 1 r < e i < 1 is worse than playing i = 1 against this mixed strategy.
Hence, i = 1 and i = 1   r, give the same payo when played against this mixed strategy, and all other
possible pure strategies give a worse payo when played against this mixed strategy. This completes the
derivation of the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium.
To determine whether the principal prefers limited or unlimited capacity, recall that under unlimited
capacity agents supply weak signals, and the principal approves both proposals, E [w] = 2(   ). Unlike
the case in which the principal was predisposed against the proposals, if the principal is predisposed in
favor of the proposals, the option to accept a proposal has (ex ante) value in equilibrium. Limited capacity
therefore imposes an expected cost on the principal, as she does not have the option to implement one
of the proposals that she would choose to implement if capacity were unlimited. For the limited capacity
system to be preferred, it must result in a suciently large increase in signal accuracy; accepting at most
one proposal with better information about its quality must dominate accepting both proposals with no
additional information about their quality. In the case where   2  
p
2, limited capacity induces an
equilibrium in which both signals are fully revealing. If at least one of the proposals is good, then a good
proposal is implemented. Thus when   2 
p
2 the principal prefers the limited capacity system (ex ante)




 2(   ) ()  
2
2   2 + 2
Next consider the case when  < 2  
p
2. If limited capacity induces a fully-informative signal by only one
of the agents (as always happens in the asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium and sometimes happens in
the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium) the principal implements the proposal associated with the fully
informative signal if and only if it is a good proposal. If the realization of the fully informative signal is
bad, she implements the proposal about which she is uninformed. If she anticipates that agents play the
asymmetric pure strategy equilibrium in the case  < 2  
p
2, then for such , the principal prefers limited
capacity if and only if
 (1   ) + (1   )(   )  2(   ) ()   2
If the principal anticipates that agents play the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in the case  < 2 
p
2,
then for such  the principal prefers limited capacity if and only if
(1   p)
2 (1   )
 
2   2
+ 2p(1   p)( (1   ) + (1   )(   )) + p2 (   )  2(   )
()
 
54   173 + 152   4
53   112 + 8   2
The threshold value ~  from Proposition 3.6 follows immediately from the above analysis. If   2  
p
2
then ~  =

2
2 2+2. If  < 2  
p
2 and the principal anticipates that agents play one of the asymmetric pure
strategy Nash equilibria of the rst stage, then ~  = 2. If  < 2  
p
2 and the principal anticipates that






 2 [~ ;) it is better for the principal to implement a single proposal with access to better information about
proposal quality, than to decide to implement both proposals based solely on prior information.
387.1.3 When limited capacity does not increase signal accuracy
In the body of the paper, we only briey discuss the parameter cases under which limited capacity does
not increase signal accuracy. This includes when the principal is predisposed against policies that are
most-likely good, or predisposed in favor of policies that are most-likely bad. When she is predisposed
against proposals that are most likely good, the agents provide fully-informative signals under both unlimited
and limited capacity and therefore the principal can be no more informed than she was under unlimited
capacity. The slightly less-straightforward case is when the principal is predisposed in favor of proposals
which are most-likely bad. In this case, the agents supply weak signals when capacity is unlimited. Here,
we establish that that the unique Nash equilibrium under limited capacity involves the agents choosing
completely uninformative / weak signals, 1 = 2 = 1
2:
We rst show that the best response of player i to any signal accuracy j > 1
2 is a weak signal, that is





2 >  () for any  > 1
2. Suppose rst that the other agent
chooses j > 1
2. By choosing i 2 [1
2;r] and i < j, agent i assures himself payo 1    (j):Notice that





 (i) >  (i)(1    (j))
and







Thus the payo of choosing any i 2 [1
2;r] and i < j against j > 1
2 is greater than the payo of choosing
any other value of i. If j = 1
2, then agent i's payo from choosing i = 1
2 is just 1
2 which is greater than
his payo of choosing any i > 1
2. Thus 1 = 2 = 1
2 is a Nash equilibrium, and no other Nash equilibrium
exists.
7.2 Details involving the general model
Detailed involving the general model are provided in the online appendix.
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408 ONLINE APPENDIX
The remainder of the document is intended for publication as an online appendix. Here, we walk through
the analysis of the general game in detail. There does not exist a one-to-one relationship between the claims
in this document and the Lemmas and Propositions in the paper. Although each of the results in the
paper follow immediately from one or more of the claims proven here. Lemma 4.1 is restated by Claim 1.
Lemma 4.2 follows the analysis in the body of the paper, as well as Claim 2. Lemma 4.3 follows from the
characterization of all possible equilibria (Claims 3 through 8). Lemma 4.4 follows from Claim 3, Lemma 4.5
from Claim 8, Lemma 4.6 from Claim 5, Lemma 4.7 from Claim 6, Lemma 4.8 from Claim 4, and Lemma
4.9 from Claim 7. Propositions 4.10 and 4.11 follow from the Lemmas and the analysis in the body of the
paper.
Claim 1: Consider any valid random variable   with support conned to the unit interval and expectation
. If the prior belief is  then there exists a signal for which the ex ante posterior belief is  .
Proof. As   is valid, it has a countable set of mass points M. Let mj represent an element of M and j
represent the jump in the CDF at mj. The density of   is given by













Observe that the supports of  g; b coincide exactly with the support of  . Observe also that if E[ ] = 
then these densities do indeed integrate to one. Consider the signal given by the pair ( g; b). For this
signal, the posterior belief associated with a draw of s is
pg(s)





)p(s) + (1   )( 1 s
1 )p(s)
= s
Thus, for this signal, the posterior belief associated with a draw of s from this signal structure is simply s
itself. The density of the posterior belief is therefore equal to the density of a draw from this signal structure:
pg(x) + (1   )pb(x) = p(x)
Thus, we have constructed a signal structure for which the ex ante posterior belief is  .39
Claim 2: Any random variable   for which Pr(0 <   < ) > 0 is never a best response.
Proof. Suppose that in response to the action of player j player i were to choose random variable  i which
puts strictly positive probability mass on realizations in the interval (0;). Consider a new random variable
^  i constructed in the following way: 1) move all mass in the interval (0;) to a mass point on 0. This reduces
the expected value, but does not aect the agent's payo. Next distribute some mass from the mass point
on 0 to a new mass point on 1 in such a way that the expected value of the variable ^  i is i. This new
random variable dominates the original, because the probability mass on 1 leads to a strict increase in the
probability of winning.
39This construction is not unique.
41Claim 3: If L  2 2
2  then it is a Nash Equilibrium for each player to choose a fully revealing strategy.
Proof. An agent uses a fully-revealing strategy when he chooses a Bernoulli random variable. That is, player
i's fully revealing strategy is
Pr( i = 1) = i and Pr( i = 0) = 1   i.
A player can always use a fully revealing strategy.
Suppose that player j uses a fully informative strategy. Because random variables with realizations in
(0;) cannot be best responses, player i's best response Gi has the following structure
Pr(Gi = 0) = L, Pr(  Gi < 1) = M, Pr(Gi = 1) = H.
Let gi = E[Gij  Gi < 1]. If there is nonzero probability mass strictly between  and 1, then gi > . Thus,
either player's best response to a fully revealing strategy can be described by the following maximization
problem:
maxM;H;g M(1   j) + H(1  
j
2 )
s.t. Mgi + H = i, M + H  1,
M  0, H  0, gi  









H  0 and M  0 () i  x 
i
gi











Observe that if some combination of (x;gi) is feasible, then any combination with the same value of x but




(1 gi)2 < 0 a best response must have gi = . Thus,
u(x;) =
x i










Therefore, provided the coecient on x is negative, the best response will be to set x to its smallest feasible
value, i.e. i; if this is so, the best reply is M = 0 and H = i, the fully revealing strategy. Thus, provided
(2   j)   2(1   j)
2(1   )
 0 () j 
2   2
2   
is satised for both values, H;L each player's best response to a fully revealing signal is also a fully reveal-
ing signal. If the inequality holds for L it also holds for H.




L and H  1
2(1 + 2) then the following strategies constitute an equilibrium:
 H =
(
 with probability 1   fH
U[;  ] with probability fH
 L =
(
0 with probability 1   fL
U[;  ] with probability fL



































Proof. First we establish that the proposed strategies are admissible.




L  H, therefore   is a real number. These same conditions imply that    .
Furthermore, this condition implies that fH  fL (this condition is not necessary for admissibility but it
will play a role later). As   H;fH  0, fL is obviously positive. Finally, substituting and simplifying





 < 0; fL  fH  1. If H  1
2(1 + 2) then    1. Finally, we check that both
random variables have the required expectations.
E[ L] =
2L
  + 
  + 
2
= L
E[ H] = (1  
2(H   )
    
) +
2(H   )
    
  + 
2
= H
We now show that the proposed strategies are mutual best responses. According to Lemma 1, any best





0 with probability 1   M   H
GM with probability M
GH with probability H
Where GM is a random variable with support contained in [;  ], E[GM] =  gM, and density gM(x), while
GH is a random variable with support contained in [ ;1] and E[GH] =  gH and density gH(x). If a mass
point exists at   then it is part of GM (no mass point at left endpoint exists in GH). Furthermore, no mass
point at  exists in GM. Such mass point leads to ties with positive probability; using a mass point of  + 
leads to all ties at  breaking in favor of player L.
In order for ^  L to be admissible, it must be that M gM + H gH = L, which implies
 gM =
L   H gH
M
43Consider the expected payo of playing ^  L against  H:




    
gM(x) dx) + H
= M(1   fH + fH
 gM   
    
) + H
= M(1   fH + fH
L H gH
M   
    
) + H
= H
       fH gH
    
+ M
       fH 
    
+
LfH
    
.
Observe that the coecient on M is equal to 0:
       fH  =       
2(H   )




H   2   (    H)2
    
=
2




    
= 0.
Thus, the payo of any admissible best response ^  L does not depend on the value of M or n the random
variable GM. Moreover, as no mass point exists in GH at the left endpoint,  gH >  . Therefore    fH  =
0 !        fH gH < 0: Hence, in any best response, it must be that H = 0. Therefore, a random variable
is a best response to  H if and only if it has the structure of  L, with H = 0. As the strategy  L proposed
in the proposition, satises these criteria,  L is a best reply to  H.
As we have already shown, any best reply to  L has the following structure:
^  H =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 with probability 1   L   M   H
 with probability L
GM with probability M
GH with probability H
Where GM is a random variable with support contained in [;  ], E[GM] =  gM, and density gM(x), while
GH is a random variable with support contained in [ ;1] and E[GH] =  gH and density gH(x). If a mass
point exists at   then it is part of GM (no mass point at left endpoint exists in GH). Also, GM has no mass
point at .
In order for ^  H to be admissible, it must be that L + M gM + H gH = H, which implies
 gM =
H   H gH   L
M
.
44Consider the expected payo of playing ^  H against  L:




    
gM(x) dx) + H
= L(1   fL) + M(1   fL + fL
 gM   
    
) + H
= L(1   fL) + M(1   fL + fL
L H gH L
M   
    
) + H
= H
       fL gH
    
+ (L + M)
       fL 
    
+
HfL
    
.





fH  fL. Moreover, because  gH >  the coecient on H is strictly less than the one on (L + M): There-
fore, in the best response, H = 0 and L + M = 1. As the strategy in the proposition satises these





L   and L  1





0 with probability 1   fH1   fH2
 with probability fH1
U[;  ] with probability fH2
 L =
(
0 with probability 1   fL
U[;  ] with probability fL







fH2 = fL = 1  
p
2

























L this dierence is negative. Thus, all probabilities are valid. Observe that
L  1
2(1   2) !    1. Next we demonstrate that the expected values are correct:
E[ L] = fL(
 +  
2
) = (1  
p
2
L + 2   L

)(






E[ H] = fH1 + fH2(





+ L = H
Next, we demonstrate that the strategies are mutual best replies. According to Lemma1, any admissible





0 with probability 1   M   H
GM with probability M
GH with probability H
Where GM is a random variable with support contained in [;  ], E[GM] =  gM, and density gM(x), while
GH is a random variable with support contained in [ ;1] and E[GH] =  gH and density gH(x). If a mass
point exists at   then it is part of GM (no mass point at left endpoint exists in GH). Furthermore, no mass
point at  exists in GM. Such mass point leads to ties with positive probability; using a mass point of  + 
leads to all ties at  breaking in favor of player L. In order for this strategy to be admissible, it must be that
M gM + H gH = L ()  gM =
L   H gH
M
The expected payo of using such a strategy against  H is given by:




    
gM(x) dx) + H
= M(1   fH2 + fH2
 gM   
    
) + H
= M(1   fH2 + fH2
L H gH
M   
    
) + H
= H
       fH2 gH
    
+ M
       fH2 
    
+
LfH2
    
.
Observe that the coecient on H is always less than the coecient on M, hence, for a best response it
must be that H = 0. Furthermore, observe that the coecient on M = 0. To see this, note















Thus, the payo of any strategy of the type ^  L is independent of M and GM. Therefore, any admissible
random variable of structure ^  Lis a best response, provided H = 0. As the strategy  L is consistent with
these requirements, it is a best response.




> > > <
> > > :
0 with probability 1   L   M   H
 with probability L
GM with probability M
GH with probability H
Where GM is a random variable with support contained in [;  ], E[GM] =  gM, and density gM(x), while
GH is a random variable with support contained in [ ;1] and E[GH] =  gH and density gH(x). If a mass
point exists at   then it is part of GM (no mass point at left endpoint exists in GH). Also, GM has no mass
point at .
46In order for ^  H to be admissible, it must be that L + M gM + H gH = H, which implies
 gM =
H   H gH   L
M
.
Consider the expected payo of playing ^  H against  L:




    
gM(x) dx) + H
= L(1   fL) + M(1   fL + fL
 gM   
    
) + H
= L(1   fL) + M(1   fL + fL
H H gH L
M   
    
) + H
= H
       fL gH
    
+ (L + M)
       fL 
    
+
HfL
    
.
Observe that the coecient on (L + M) = 0 because, fL = fH2 and, as demonstrated previously
 (1   fH2)    = 0. Thus, the payo to any admissible ^  L is independent of L;M;GM. However,
because  gH >   the coecient on H is negative. Thus, in a best response, it must be that H = 0. Hence,
any random variable of the structure ^  H is a best response, provided H = 0. As the strategy in the propo-





L   and 1
2(1 2)  L  2 2
2  then the following strategies constitute an equilibrium:
 H =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 with probability 1   fH1   fH2   fH3
 with probability fH1
U[;  ] with probability fH2





0 with probability 1   fL1   fL2
U[;  ] with probability fL1
1 with probability fL2







fH2 = fL1 =
    





L + 2)(L +
p
2
L + 2   (2   ))
2
fH3 = fL2 =
2   2 




L + 2   L
2 )
Proof. We rst demonstrate that the strategies of both players are admissible. First, observe that if
1
2(1   2)  L  2 2
2  then      1. These inequalities also imply that fH2 = fL1  0 and fH3 =
fL2  0. It is also obvious that fH1  0. To prove that all probabilities are less than 1, we establish that
fH1 + fH2 + fH3  1. This inequality implies that fL1 + fL2  1.











47Finally, we demonstrate that both random variables have the correct expected values.
E[ L] = fL1
 +  
2
+ fL2 =
    
2    
(
 +  
2
) +
2   2 
2    
= L
E[ H] = fH1 + E[ L] = H
Next, we establish that the proposed strategies are mutual best responses. According to Lemma 1, any
admissible best response to  H, denoted ^  L must have the following structure:
^  L =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 with probability 1   M   H   H1
GM with probability M
GH with probability H
1 with probability H1
Where GM is a random variable with support contained in [;  ], E[GM] =  gM, and density gM(x), while
GH is a random variable with support contained in [ ;1] and E[GH] =  gH and density gH(x). If a mass
point exists at   then it is part of GM, and if a mass point exists at 1, it is not part of GH (no mass point
exists at endpoints of GH). Furthermore, no mass point at  exists in GM. Such mass point leads to ties
with positive probability; using a mass point of  +  leads to all ties at  breaking in favor of player L. In
order for this strategy to be admissible, it must be that
M gM + H gH + H1 = L ()  gM =
L   H gH   H1
M
The expected payo of using such a strategy against  H is given by:




    




= M(1   fH2   fH3 + fH2
 gM   
    




= M(1   fH2   fH3 + fH2
L H gH H1
M   
    





2(    )(1   fH3)   2 fH2
2(    )
+ H
2(    )(1   fH3)   2 fH2   2fH2( gH    )
2(    )
+ H1
2(    )(1   fH3)   2 fH2
2(    )
+
2LfH2
2(    )
.
Observe rst that the coecient on H is less than the coecient on either M or H, hence, for any best
response, H = 0. Furthermore,
2(    )(1   fH3)   2 fH2 = 2(    )(1  
2   2 
2    
)   2 
    
2    
= 0.
Thus, the payo of any admissible random variable does not depends on H1;M;GM. Thus any random
variable with the structure ^  L and H = 0 is a best response to  H. In particular,  L is a best response to
 H.
Next, we show that  H is a best response to  L. According to Lemma 1, any admissible best response
48to  L, denoted ^  H must have the following structure:
^  H =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 with probability 1   M   H   H1
GM with probability M
GH with probability H
1 with probability H1
Where GM is a random variable with support contained in [;  ], E[GM] =  gM, and density gM(x), while
GH is a random variable with support contained in [ ;1] and E[GH] =  gH and density gH(x). If a mass
point exists at   then it is part of GM, and if a mass point exists at 1, it is not part of GH (no mass point
exists in GH). In order for this strategy to be admissible, it must be that
M gM + H gH + H1 = H ()  gM =
H   H gH   H1
M
.
The expected payo of using such a strategy against  L is given by:




    




Because of the equalities fL1 = fH2;fL2 = fH3 this equation becomes
M(1   fH2   fH3 + fH2
 gM   
    




= M(1   fH2   fH3 + fH2
L H gH H1
M   
    





2(    )(1   fH3)   2 fH2
2(    )
+ H
2(    )(1   fH3)   2 fH2   2fH2( gH    )
2(    )
+ H1
2(    )(1   fH3)   2 fH2
2(    )
+
2HfH2
2(    )
.
Thus, from the previous equation, it follows that in any best response H = 0. Furthermore, the payo of
any admissible strategy is independent of M;H1;GM, thus any admissible strategy with H = 0 is a best
response. As  H satises these criteria it is a best response.





2(1 + 2)  H  2 2+
2






 with probability 1   fH1   fH2
U[;  ] with probability fH1





0 with probability 1   fL1   fL2
U[;  ] with probability fL1
1 with probability fL2





    
2    
49fH2 =
2   2 
2    
fL1 =
2L(    )
(2    )2   2
fL2 =
4L(1    )
(2    )2   2
E[up] =




L  H;  
is a real number. Observe that 1
2(1 + 2)  H  2 2+
2
2  !      1. Under these conditions, clearly
both fH1;fH2 are positive. Furthermore, fH1 + fH2   1 =   









This inequality will play a signicant role again later in the proof. For now, note that
2   L  
q
2
L + 2   ( + 2(1   L)) = L     
q
2
L + 2 < 0
The right hand side equals zero when  = 0 and has a negative derivative in . Thus,
   2   L  
q
2
L + 2 !     + 2(1   L)
Observe that   H ! 2   = H +
p
2
H   2  . Hence fL1;fL2  0: Next, observe that fL1+fL2 1 =
  (+2(1 L))
2     0 as described above. Therefore  H; L are random variables. They are admissible if they
satisfy the constraints on the expected values.
E[ H] = (1   fH1 + fH2) + fH1
 +  
2
+ fH2 =
2 + (2    )2
2(2    )
= H
E[ L] = fL1
 +  
2
+ fL2 = L





2(1 + 2)  H  2 2+
2
2  means that L  2 2
2  .
Next, we establish that the proposed strategies are mutual best responses. According to Lemma 1, any
admissible best response to  H, denoted ^  L must have the following structure:
^  L =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 with probability 1   M   H   H1
GM with probability M
GH with probability H
1 with probability H1
Where GM is a random variable with support contained in [;  ], E[GM] =  gM, and density gM(x), while
GH is a random variable with support contained in [ ;1] and E[GH] =  gH and density gH(x). If a mass
point exists at   then it is part of GM, and if a mass point exists at 1, it is not part of GH (no mass point
exists at endpoints of GH). Furthermore, no mass point at  exists in GM. Such mass point leads to ties
with positive probability; using a mass point of  +  leads to all ties at  breaking in favor of player L. In
50order for this strategy to be admissible, it must be that
M gM + H gH + H1 = L ()  gM =
L   H gH   H1
M
.
The expected payo of using such a strategy against  H is given by:




    




= M(1   fH1   fH2 + fH1
 gM   
    




= M(1   fH1   fH2 + fH1
L H gH H1
M   
    





(    )(1   fH2)    fH1
(    )
+ H1
(2   fH2)(    )   2fH1
2(    )
+ H(
(2   fH2)(    )   2fH1
2(    )
 
fH1( gH    )
    
) +
LfH1
    
.
Clearly, the coecient on H is less than the coecient on H1. Thus, in any best response, H = 0. It is
also easy to check that the coecient on M;H1 are equal to zero. Thus the payo to using a strategy of
type ^  L is independent of M;H1;GM. Thus any random variable in class ^  L is a best response, provided
H = 0. As  L satises these criteria, it is a best response.
Next, we show that  H is a best response to  L. According to Lemma 1, any admissible best response
to  L, denoted ^  H must have the following structure:
^  H =
8
> > > <
> > > :
0 with probability 1   M   H   H1
GM with probability M
GH with probability H
1 with probability H1
Where GM is a random variable with support contained in [;  ], E[GM] =  gM, and density gM(x), while
GH is a random variable with support contained in [ ;1] and E[GH] =  gH and density gH(x). If a mass
point exists at   then it is part of GM, and if a mass point exists at 1, it is not part of GH (no mass point
exists in GH). In order for this strategy to be admissible, it must be that
M gM + H gH + H1 = H ()  gM =
H   H gH   H1
M
The expected payo of using such a strategy against  L is given by:




    




By symmetry with the previous calculations this simplies to:
M
(    )(1   fL2)    fL1
(    )
+ H1
(2   fL2)(    )   2fL1
2(    )
+H(
(2   fL2)(    )   2fL1
2(    )
 
fL1( gH    )
    
) +
HfL1
    
51As in the previous calculation, H1 = 0 for any best response. Next observe that
2((    )(1   fL2)    fL1) = (2   fL2)(    )   2fL1 =
2(    )
(2    )2   2
=
2(    )
(2    )2   2(  2 + (4   2L) + 2 + 4L   4)
This is larger than zero, provided    2   L  
p
2
L + 2, which was demonstrated previously. Hence, any
random variable in class ^  H is a best response, provided H = 0. As the strategy  H satises these criteria,
it is a best response.
Claim 8: If L  2 2
2  and H  2 2+
2
2  then it is a Nash Equilibrium for player L to use a fully revealing
strategy, and for player H to use a quasi-revealing strategy.

















We refer to this strategy as quasi-revealing because, like the fully revealing signal, it is binary and a good
signal realization reveals the proposal to be good for sure. Unlike the fully revealing signal, a bad realization
does not reduce the principal's posterior to 0, but only to .
A fully revealing strategy is always admissible. A quasi-revealing strategy is well-dened i H  . By
assumption, H  2 2+
2
2  =  + 2
(1 )
2
2   , thus a quasi-revealing strategy is admissible for player H.
We rst establish that a quasi-revealing strategy for player H is a best reply to a fully revealing strategy






0 with probability 1   M   H
GM with probability M
1 with probability H
Where GM is a random variable with support contained in [;  ], E[GM] =  gM, and density gM(x). If a
mass point exists at 1, it is not part of GM. In order for such a strategy to be admissible it must be that
M gM + H = H
Thus, player H best response is characterized by the solution to the following maximization:
maxM;H;g M(1   L) + H(1  
L
2 )
s.t. M gM + H = H, M + H  1
M  0, H  0,  gM  
52Thus for any best response it must be that M gM + H = H and M + H = x  1 which implies
H =
H    gMx
1    gM
, M =
x   H
1    gM
.
In addition,
H  0 and M  0 () H  x 
H
 gM
The payo of playing this strategy is simply
u(x;gi) =
x   H
1    gM
(1   L) +
H    gMx





Observe that if some combination of (x;  gM) is feasible, then any combination with the same value of x but
smaller value of  gM is also feasible. Because du
d gM =  1
2H
x H

















Therefore, provided the coecient on x is positive, the best response will be to set x to its largest feasible
value min[1;
H
 ]. However, H  2 2+
2
2  ! H  . Thus, if the coecient on x is positive, the best




1  , the quasi-revealing signal. Therefore,
if
(2   L)   2(1   L)
2(1   )
 0 () L 
2   2
2   
The best reply of player H to a fully revealing signal on the part of L is a quasi-revealing signal. Next,





0 with probability 1   M   H
GM with probability M
1 with probability H
Where GM is a random variable with support contained in [;  ], E[GM] =  gM, and density gM(x). Clearly,
choosing GM with a mass point at  leads to ties with positive probability. Choosing a mass point at  + 
leads all ties to break in favor of player L, causing a discrete jump in payo when a tie occurs, at expense
of a marginal reduction in payo otherwise. Thus, no mass point exists on  in a best response. If a mass
point exists at 1, it is not part of GM. In order for such a strategy to be admissible it must be that
M gM + H = H
Thus, player H best response is characterized by the solution to the following maximization:
maxM;H;g M(1   L) + H(1  
L
2 )
s.t. M gM + H = H, M + H  1
M  0, H  0,  gM > 
Note that, because ties are dominated, the last inequality is strict. Thus for any best response it must be
53that M gM + H = H and M + H = x  1, which implies
H =
H    gMx
1    gM
, M =
x   H
1    gM
In addition,
H  0 and M  0 () H  x 
H
 gM
The payo of playing this strategy is simply
u(x;gi) =
x   H
1    gM
(1   L) +
H    gMx





Observe that if some combination of (x;  gM) is feasible, then any combination with the same value of x but
smaller value of  gM is also feasible. Because du
d gM =  1
2H
x H
(1  gM)2 < 0 agent L would always like to set  gM to
be as small as possible, but still above . Thus, because of an open set problem, if M > 0 the best response
is not uniquely dened. Observe, however, that the payo of using any strategy with M > 0 is strictly less
than the payo the player would expect if all ties broke in favor of L, and  gM = , but if M = 0, then the

















Therefore, provided the coecient on x is negative, player L best response is well-dened, as it requires
x = L which means that L plays the fully revealing signal and M = 0. Therefore, if
(2   H)   2(1   H)
2(1   )
 0 () H 
2   2
2   
Since H  2 2+
2
2   2 2
2  , the required inequality holds. The best reply of player L to player H providing
a fully-revealing signal is to provide a quasi-revealing signal.
54